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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines how the development of nationalism and foundation of nation-states in the 
Levant have contributed to the development of new national identities among the Druze 
communities in the Golan Heights and Israel and how it has impacted each community.  This 
study builds on the ideas of Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm regarding nationalism and 
the development of the nation as both invented and imagined.  This thesis then analyzes the 
policies of Israel and Syria regarding the Druze communities in the Golan Heights and the 
question of Druze feelings toward these policies.  It also examines how Druze history has been 
framed in the context of the nation-state.  Additionally this work examines how Israel and 
Syria’s policies toward the Druze have created an economic reliance on the state while shaping 
national identity in the process.  It also explores how Syria has facilitated agricultural 
development by assisting the Druze in the Golan Heights in the apple trade while weighing 
Israel’s neglect of this community.  Finally, I discuss the schism that exists between Israeli-
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Introduction 
 
 The rise of the nation-state and its founding ideology, nationalism, has fundamentally 
transformed the world we live in.  Nationalism is continuously forging new states from the old 
and in the process creating artificial boundaries uniting the people within them and dividing them 
from the rest of the world. In every nation there are segments of the population who do not fall 
neatly into the narrative of the founding ideology.  These segments of the population are often 
subjected to varying degrees of persecution and oppression ranging from forced integration, 
social and political exclusion to ethnic cleansing and genocide in the most extreme cases.1  In 
some cases the founding nationalism is modified or marketed differently to marginalized groups 
in hopes of influencing these communities to support the state.  The case of the Druze in Syria 
and Israel demonstrates how the rise and modification of nationalisms have impacted traditional 
communities by creating cleavages that did not exist historically. 
 The Druze communities that inhabit the mountainous terrain of today’s Northern Israel, 
South-Eastern Syria and Lebanon have traditionally enjoyed communal solidarity.  By the 
1920’s currents of nationalism were spreading in the Middle East and the Druze had become 
known for their fierce resistance to outside control and the relative autonomy they had carved out 
of the Ottoman Empire.2  As the nation-states were being formed in the aftermath of World War 
I elites sought to integrate the Druze communities into incipient states.  The Druze in Lebanon 
played an important role in the founding of the nation-state that they had helped lay the ground 
work for in the nineteenth century; however the situation was quite different for the Druze in 
nascent Israel and Syria. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Ben	  Kiernan,	  "Myth,	  Nationalism,	  Genocide,"	  Journal	  of	  Genocide	  Research,	  2001:	  187-­‐206.	  	  Emily	  Greble	  Balic,	  "When	  Croatia	  Needes	  Serbs:	  Nationalism	  and	  Genocide	  in	  Sarajevo,	  1941-­‐1941,"	  Slavic	  Review,	  2009:	  116-­‐138.	  	  Taner	  Akçam,	  From	  Empire	  to	  Republic:	  The	  Armenian	  Genocide	  and	  Turkish	  Nationalism	  (London:	  Zed	  Books,	  2004).	  2	  Phillip	  K	  Hitti,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Druze	  (Beirut:	  Saqi	  Books,	  2008).	  9	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 The controversial nature of Israel’s formation and establishment created an immediate 
enemy in Syria.  The leadership of both Israel and Syria viewed the Druze as a potentially strong 
ally and dangerous fifth column.  Elements within Israel and Syria cultivated the Druze loyalty to 
the state through state institutions such as the military and economic incentives.  In Israel these 
efforts were deemed so successful that the government was certain it could replicate this feat 
with Syrian Druze living in the Golan Heights after Israel occupied the Syrian territory following 
the 1967 War.  Despite the Israeli authorities’ confidence the Golan-Druze proudly clung to their 
attachments to Syria.  The Syrian government continued to exercise its influence in the Golan 
Heights through a variety of activities aimed at maintaining Druze loyalty.3   
The political relationship between Israel and Syria has complicated the relations between 
the Druze living in the Golan-Heights and those living in Israel proper.4  The rise of nation-state 
and Israel’s and Syria’s competition for the loyalty of the Druze have created new identities and 
with these new identities divisions within the Druze communities.  The goal of this research is to 
explain how nationalism in combination with the rise of the nation-state has impacted this 
minority community, which has traditionally defined itself politically in opposition to the 
‘foreign’ political authority.5  In doing so I intend to shed light on how the policies of both Syria 
and Israel are viewed within the Druze community and how the Druz have adopted emerging 
national identities. 
Literature Review 
 In spite the Druze’s political and strategic regional significance the volume of in depth 
academic studies on the peculiar sect are limited to a handful.  Most of these studies focus on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  Economist,	  "A	  Would-­‐Be	  Happy	  Link	  with	  Syria,"	  The	  Economist,	  February	  21,	  2009:	  48.	  4	  Lisa	  Hajjar,	  "Making	  Identity	  Policy:	  Israel's	  Interventions	  Among	  the	  Druze,"	  Middle	  East	  Reports,	  1996:	  2-­‐6.	  5	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  Druze	  I	  define	  ‘foreign’	  as	  coming	  from	  outside	  the	  greater	  Druze	  community.	  	  Therefore	  historically	  Turks/Ottomans,	  the	  French,	  British,	  Zionist,	  Syrian,	  and	  Lebanese	  have	  all	  been	  at	  times	  foreign	  powers	  seeking	  to	  impose	  their	  political	  will	  on	  the	  Druze	  community.	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formation of their faith and their history before the twentieth century.  The bulk of scholarly 
studies on the Druze in the twentieth century focuses on those in Lebanon particularly on their 
role in the Lebanese civil war.  In spite of the enormous amount of print space dedicated to the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue and the significance of the Druze within it there have been remarkably 
few in depth scholarly works devoted to the Israeli-Druze.  Most books that have been published 
on the Israeli-Druze community devote most of their chapters to explaining how the Israeli-
authorities succeeded at drawing the Israeli-Druze community into an alliance and their military 
role in the 1948 War.  
The first major work The Druzes in Israel: Political Innovation and Integration in a 
Middle East Minority was written by Israeli scholar Gabriel Ben-Dor in 1979.6  In The Druzes in 
Israel, Ben-Dor looks at Israeli efforts to integrate the Druze into Israeli society.  He discusses 
the contradictions that exist between cultural solidarity and religious plurality as well as those 
between a religious state and a coexistent democracy.  In the end this book questions the viability 
of a culturally diverse Jewish state and the reality of integrating minorities into a state that 
classifies itself as Jewish.  Political innovation and integration are therefore limited in Israel and 
while the Druze may be important members of Israeli society they are nonetheless still second 
class citizens.  Ben-Dor praises the Druze for their patriotism and participation in the democratic 
process while lamenting the ceiling inhibiting Druze efforts to gain equality.  In the book Ben-
Dor advocates the development of a Druze education system and discusses the problems of 
educating Druze and Arabs side by side.7  While he addresses the need to create more economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Gabriel	  Ben-­‐Dor,	  The	  Druzes	  in	  Israel:	  A	  Political	  Study	  (Jerusalem:	  The	  Magnes	  Press,	  1979).	  7	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  this	  book	  Professor	  Ben-­‐Dor	  was	  chairing	  a	  committee	  that	  was	  tasked	  with	  creating	  a	  new	  Israeli-­‐Druze	  curriculum.	  	  He	  also	  had	  previously	  testified	  to	  the	  Knesset	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  marginalizing	  the	  Druze	  and	  advocated	  this	  new	  curriculum	  among	  other	  reforms	  directed	  at	  the	  Druze.	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opportunities for the Druze he fails to mention how Israel’s land policies have unfairly impacted 
the community. 
In response to Ben-Dor’s work Kais Firro, an Israeli-Druze scholar, penned The Druzes 
in the Jewish State in 1999.8  This work is widely considered the most comprehensive and 
methodologically sound on the Israeli-Druze community.  In it Firro seeks to give a sound 
narrative of the Druze’s relationship with Israel but also to clarify the reasons behind the 
community’s continued cooperation with Israeli authorities.  The author’s thesis asserts that 
Israeli authorities were able utilize the peculiar nature of the Druze faith and community to drive 
a wedge between the Israeli-Druze and the Palestinians while inventing traditions that 
emphasized commonalities between the Zionists and the Druze.  Firro then builds on this idea 
explaining how the Israeli authorities exploited the internal politics of the Israeli-Druze 
community to empower those willing to cooperate with them.  Finally Firro illustrates how 
Israeli policies directed toward the Druze community created an economic reliance on the state 
through land expropriation, lack of village development, and career opportunities in the military, 
education, and other government services.  It is clear from Firro’s narrative that he considers the 
Druze to be Arabs and that he laments the success of Israel’s policies.  He concludes his book 
contending that the powerful combination of economic interests, invented tradition, and the co-
opted Druze elite ensure that little will change in the Israeli-Druze community both in terms of 
equality and acceptance of their Arab heritage. 
Rehashing much of Firro’s work Laila Parsons published The Druze Between Palestine 
and Israel, 1947-1949 detailing the origins of Druze service in the IDF and their military role in 
the 1948 war.9  Like Firro, Parsons does not give credence to the idea that the Druze share 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Kais	  Firro,	  The	  Druzes	  in	  the	  Jewish	  State:	  A	  Brief	  History	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  1999).	  9	  Laila	  Parsons,	  The	  Druze	  Between	  Paslestine	  and	  Israel,	  1947-­‐1949	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin's	  Press,	  Inc.,	  2000).	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common ancestry with the Jewish people and that this was their motivation for their choice to 
fight along side them.  Unlike Firro, she does not mention how some leaders within the Jewish 
Agency championed this idea as early as 1939 instead asserting that it developed after the two 
groups collaborated with each other.  Her thesis stresses that the Israeli-Druze decision to fight 
along side the Zionist forces was a shrewd “political calculation.”10  Using sources from Israeli 
archives Parsons gives a detailed account of how Syrian-Druze soldiers fighting in the Arab 
Liberation Army were eventually integrated into Moshe Dayan’s brigade and their role in 
combat.  She also focuses a great deal on the efforts of Israelis to cultivate relationships with the 
Druze elite and how this eventually shifted the Druze from neutrality to fighting in the Zionist 
army. 
The Israeli-Druze have been able to carve out a somewhat prestigious position in Israel in 
comparison to other Arab minorities, however inequality in relation to Jews remains an issue for 
the Israeli-Druze community.  In Druze and Jew in Israel: A Shared Destiny? Zaydān ‘Aṭashī, a 
former member of the Israeli foreign service and member of Knesset, seeks to unite the Druze 
and Jews through common trends in their historical experience.11  Among the common historical 
experience of the Druze and Jews he mentions the efforts of Jews to assimilate with European 
culture during the Diaspora and the years of persecution and discrimination they experienced in 
“exile.”  According to ‘Aṭashī these experience parallel with the persecution and oppression the 
Druze have faced in the Levant.  This work is less a true scholarly work and more of a politically 
motivated work seeking better treatment for the Druze within Israel.  ‘Aṭashī asserts that the 
Israeli-Druze have done all that Israel has asked of them and have not received fair treatment in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Ibid.	  144	  11	  Zeidan	  Atashi,	  Druze	  and	  Jews	  in	  Israel:	  A	  Shared	  Destiny?	  (Brighton:	  Sussex	  Academic	  Press,	  1995).	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return.  ‘Aṭashī uses a question mark in the title of the book to insinuate that it is up to the Israeli 
government whether or not this so-called shared destiny has a future. 
As mentioned earlier the number of in depth academic works on the Israeli-Druze are 
very limited.  There are a number of smaller academic papers that contribute significantly to our 
understanding of the Israeli-Druze community and are therefore worth mentioning.  Deborah 
Court, Randa Abbas, and Shmuel Shamai all examine the role of the Druze education system in 
Israel and how it impacts the community both in the Golan Heights and Israel proper.  Court and 
Abbas specifically examined the Druze heritage curriculum in the Israeli-Druze school system 
and how it impacts identity and prepares the Druze for compulsory military service.12  Through  
interviews with both students and teachers in these schools they explain how Druze and Israeli 
identities are intertwined and how military service is often a major component of the Israeli-
Druze identity.  Dr. Shamai uses the concepts of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to explain 
how Druze students in the Golan generate symbolic capital through anti-Israeli and pro-Syrian 
activities.13  He explains how this symbolic capital often enables them to receive scholarships to 
study in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries.  His study highlights how both Syria and 
Israel compete for the loyalty and cooperation of the Golan Druze community in the field of 
education.   
Identity is another popular topic among scholars writing about the Israeli-Druze.  Lisa 
Hajjar criticizes Israel’s policies directed toward the Druze community and accuses the state of 
imposing identities on the population in the Golan Heights.14  She asserts that this has been 
detrimental to the relationship between the Israeli-Druze community and the Golan-Druze 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Deborah	  Court	  and	  Randa	  Abbas,	  "Role	  of	  Druze	  High	  Schools	  in	  Shaping	  Students	  Identity	  and	  Citizenship,"	  Education,	  Citizenship,	  and	  Social	  Justice,	  2010:	  145-­‐162.	  13	  Shmuel	  Shamai,	  "Critical	  Sociology	  of	  Education	  Theory	  in	  Practice:	  The	  Druze	  Education	  in	  the	  Golan,"	  
British	  Journal	  of	  Sociology	  of	  Education,	  1990:	  449-­‐463.	  14	  Hajjar.	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community noting the low marriage rates that exist between them.  She also criticizes how this 
has impacted gender roles and interactions in Druze society noting that Druze serving in the 
Israeli army develop views that contradict with traditional Druze ideas and practices concerning 
men and women.  Mordechai Nisan problematizes Druze identity within the confines of the 
political arena in Israel.15  He notes that the Druze simultaneously adhere to a strong sense of 
patriotism while admitting to feelings of discrimination and mistreatment by Israeli society.  
Nisan sees somewhat of a paradox in Israeli-Druze attitudes toward the state, saying they 
“vigorously defend” the state and its interests while “campaigning” against it for improved 
socio-economic conditions for the Druze community.  Ilana Kaufman also touches on Israeli-
Druze identity debating whether or not Israeli’s policies toward the Druze community is a form 
of ethnic manipulation.16  She eventually sides with scholars like Firro and Hajjar asserting that 
Israel’s policies “threaten to undo the unique position of the Druze between Jews and Arabs.”17 
The limited amount of scholarship addressing the Druze in Israel has left large gaps in the 
historical record of this community.  There is very little scholarship devoted to the Druze who 
occupy the slopes of Mt. Hermon in the Golan Heights.  There is still less scholarship dealing 
with issues of Druze solidarity in the midst of regional tension.  These are topics that need to be 
studied in order to better understand this community that straddles some of the most volatile 
borders in the world and how their unique geographical location and the influence of states has 
shaped Druze identity.  In a broader sense this study seeks to explain how minorities act within 
the limits of the nation-state and how both the society and government of the nation-state receive 
or reject minorities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Mordechai	  Nisan,	  "The	  Druze	  in	  Israel:	  Questions	  of	  Identity,	  Citizenship,	  and	  Patriotism,"	  The	  Middle	  East	  
Journal,	  2010:	  575-­‐596.	  16	  Ilana	  Kaufman,	  "Ethnic	  Affirmation	  or	  Ethnic	  Manipulation:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Druze	  in	  Israel,"	  Nationalism	  
and	  Ethnic	  Politics,	  2004:	  53-­‐82.	  17	  Ibid.	  53	  
	   11	  
Theorizing the Influence of Nationalism in Identity Formation 
 A great deal of literature has been produced trying to describe the rise of nationalism and 
the emergence of the nation-state.  Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, published in 
1983, asserts that nationalism and nations are a modern phenomena.  Anderson describes the 
nation as an imagined political community. It is “imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of 
them.”18  According to Anderson nationalism grew out of the emergence of print capitalism in 
Europe along with the demise of elite languages such as Latin.  The circulation of new print 
media then began to unite people who had previously been divided by geographical barriers.  
Over time peoples in Europe and the Americas imagined themselves as part of a larger 
community connected by linguistic similarities sharing similar interests and histories. 
Eric Hobsbawm contends that nations and nationalism are the result of invented traditions 
that link the modern nation to antiquity.19  According to Hobsbawm traditions are invented by 
the elites (often the state) in order to “inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”20  Thus nations are constructed 
through invented traditions, ceremonies, rites, and histories that tie the modern nation to a 
gloried and immortal past.  Both Hobsbawm and Anderson view the nation as a modern 
construct and result of various historical processes over the last three centuries. 21  These theories 
were attacked by scholars from the emerging field of subaltern studies who claimed that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Bennedict	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Origin	  and	  Spread	  of	  Nationalism	  (London:	  Verso,	  2006).	  6	  19	  Eric	  Hobsbawm	  and	  Terrance	  Ranger,	  The	  Invention	  of	  Tradition	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1983).	  6	  20	  Ibid.	  1	  21	  Anderson’s	  theory	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  ignoring	  the	  subaltern	  in	  history.	  	  One	  scholar	  accuses	  Anderson	  of	  portraying	  “the	  nation	  as	  a	  cozy	  community	  of	  newspaper	  readers	  and	  anthem	  singers.”	  (for	  more	  see	  Özırımlı,	  130-­‐133)	  	  Scholars	  critiquing	  Hobsbawm	  assert	  that	  his	  “notion	  of	  invented	  traditions	  …	  are	  in	  facte	  more	  akin	  to	  reconstruction	  or	  rediscovery	  of	  the	  ethnic	  past.”	  (for	  more	  see	  Özırımlı,	  125-­‐127).	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Anderson and Hobsbawm universalized the ‘Western’ experience and ignored unique processes  
which led to the formation of alternative nationalisms in the colonial world.22  Partha Chatterjee, 
one the leading voices in subaltern studies, argues that, “if the nationalisms of the rest of the 
world have to choose their imagined community from certain modular forms already made 
available by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?”23 Chatterjee criticizes 
Anderson’s theory for denying colonized peoples their agency while imposing European 
nationalisms on these peoples.  This is problematic in studying the colonized world.  This study 
adopts a different perspective based on Anderson’s notion of the nation as imagined in 
opposition to and not imposed by colonial powers.  In Anderson’s interpretation of [and then 
here reference to specific historical experiences around which he makes this point] Colonialism 
enabled disparate communities under a colonial administration to experience a shared history 
that led them to imagine themselves as a nation.  As the elite within these new imagined 
communities rose to positions power and had invested interests in the nation-state they invented 
traditions to reinforce new imagined national identities. 
Anderson’s and Hobsbawm’s claims that nationalism is a modern phenomena also came 
under the fire of scholars who abide by the nationalist claims that the nation is based in antiquity 
and is thus not a new phenomenon.  Scholars adhering to these theories argue that nationality is 
natural to the human experience and that nations have their roots in ancient history.24  This 
school of nationalist studies rejects the theories of both Anderson and Hobsbawm on the grounds 
that they make the nation a work of fiction while ignoring history. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies and Postcolonial Studies," The American Historical Review, December 1994: 
1475-1490.	  14	  23	  Partha	  Chatterjee,	  The	  Nation	  and	  its	  Fragments:	  Colonial	  and	  Postcolonial	  Histories	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1993).	  5	  24	  Umut	  Özırımlı,	  Theories	  of	  Nationalism:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction,	  2nd	  Edition	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillam,	  2010).	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While the words ‘imagined’ and ‘invented’ may seem to denote that the nation is a 
fabrication, it is nonetheless real as soon as it can be shown to lead citizens to act in relation to 
its perceived interests.  Nations therefore are neither timeless nor are they fictitious, but are 
constructs of perceived truths that unite different peoples with sometimes limited commonalities. 
Nationalism therefore proves to be a versatile phenomenon, depending on the territory and 
communities in relation to which it has been mobilized.  The nationalist narrative with its 
invented traditions can be perceived with stark differences by various members of the nation.  
While nationalism and the interests of the nation often differ from town to town and from citizen 
to citizen, the nation’s strength lies in the consensus that can emerge among its citizens over who 
is a member of the nation. 
The success of nationalisms and nation-states relies on people self-identifying with both 
nationalist ideologies and its institutions.  Therefore in order to properly understand the effect of 
nationalism on society we must understand identity and identity formation.  For the purpose of 
this paper, identity “refers to the defining characteristic of an individual or group” or category.25  
Therefore a person who speaks French, is a Canadian citizen of African descent, and worships at 
a Catholic church may have more than one identity.  These identities are constructed through 
processes of self-differentiation from and self-indentification with various social, religious, and 
political signifiers.26  The modern concept of identity is both multi-faceted and hierarchical.27 
The preeminence of an individual’s competing identities will often shift according the political 
and social circumstance of the environment in which an individual resides. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Political	  Theory,	  "Identity,"	  http://www.credoreference.com.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/entry/sagept/identity	  (accessed	  May	  19,	  2012).	  26	  Ibid.	  27	  Michael	  Provence,	  The	  Great	  Syrian	  Revolt	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  Arab	  Nationalism	  (Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  2005).	  21	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 It can hardly be questioned that, broadly speaking, the Druze of Syria, Lebanon, and 
Israel, whether secular or religious, share a strong sense of communal identity.  Within the Druze 
community national identity has tended to take second to their Druze identity.  Therefore as both 
Arab nationalists and Israeli authorities have sought the loyalty of the Druze, they have had to 
confront the question of how to imagine them as part of or in relation to their nation.  For Arab 
nationalists and later Syria this meant defining the Druze as a sub-category of the Arab nation.  
They argued that the Druze culture, tradition, religion29,and language are to a considerable extent 
to those of Arabs and therefore that they must be part of the Arab nation.  The Israelis tried less 
to imagine the Druze as part of their nation instead opting to invent an Israeli-Druze nationalism 
in relation to Zionism intertwining the history and interests of the Druze and Jewish people.  
They did this by foregrounding the Druze and Jewish prophet Jethro claiming that the two 
peoples held common ancestry that bound them together.  They also argued that both the Druze 
and Jews had historically been victims of both Muslim and Christian oppression and that the 
only way to ensure their freedom would be the establishment and preservation of the state of 
Israel.  This study is concerned with the national identities of the Druze under Israeli rule and 
how these identities have created new schisms within the community with no historical 
precedent. 
Sources and Methodology 
 This work is derived from a variety of sources addressing different aspects of the Israeli-
Druze and Syrian-Druze history.  The early chapters of this study rely heavily on Minorities in 
the Middle East: The Druze Communities 1840-1974 edited by Beitullah Destani.  These four 
volumes or primary source documents consists of over 2000 pages of political dispatches, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  Druze	  are	  Muslims	  is	  another	  matter	  that	  will	  not	  be	  addressed	  in	  this	  study.	  	  Several	  Druze	  I	  spoke	  with	  described	  themselves	  as	  being	  an	  Islamic	  sect.	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correspondences, and reports concerning the Druze communities in the Levant from the middle 
of the nineteenth century to the late twentieth century.  These documents are largely derived 
from both the British and French Foreign Services and deal with the political activities of Druze 
leaders and their relations with the Ottoman, French, British, Syrian, and Israeli authorities.  
While these documents reveal the participation of the common Druze in rebellions against 
outside forces, they tell us little about their views on the political developments during the time 
period covered during this study.  These documents paint a general picture of the evolution of 
political thought within the Druze community and their stance toward the nation-state.   
 These records of Druze dealing complement those from the Central Zionist Archives used 
by scholars like Kais Firro and Laila Parsons in their studies of the Israeli-Druze.  These primary 
sources made available through Firro’s and Parsons’ work paint a picture of the continual 
discussion withing the Zionist leadership concerning the Druze.  These documents also reveal the 
attitudes of some of the members of the Zionist leadership toward the Druze and which Druze 
leaders were receptive to the Zionist overtures toward them.   
 The later chapters of this study relies heavily on newspapers articles either from Israeli or 
international print media regarding the political activities of the Druze in Israel and the occupied 
Golan-Heights.  These articles detail the Israeli-Druze community’s grievances toward the state 
of Israel and the Golan-Druze community’s continued relationship with Syria and their resistance 
to Israel’s efforts to impose citizenship upon them.  These newspaper articles allow me to flesh 
out the context of the Druze’s relationship with the state and their evolving view of citizenship 
and identity.  These news media sources are supplemented by a series of interviews I conducted 
with members of the Druze communities in Israel and the occupied Golan Heights over a brief 
one week period in March and April 2012.   I chose to conduct the majority of these interviews 
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with interlocutors living in the Golan-Heights due to the limited academic works dealing with 
this community.  I tried in my interviews to reflect a plurality of views, speaking to people 
working for Israel in the field of education, people who were graduate of the Israeli-Druze school 
system, people who studied in Syria, and elderly Druze who had reached adulthood in the Golan 
Heights prior to 1967., in addition to more random interlocutors. In all, I made twelve interviews, 
with interlocutors ranging from the ages of 17 to 72.   
 The political sensitivity of the region in relation not only to the occupation of the Golan 
Heights but also to the current situation in Syria in combination with the close knit communal 
nature of the Druze community presented significant obstacles for this study.  Additionally time 
constraints limited the number of interviews I was able to conduct with Druze interlocutors.  In 
spite of these obvious limitations, these interviews were productive and yielded useful 
information to complement my other sources and to to flesh out, to an extent, current Druze 
attitudes toward citizenship and nationality in the Golan Heights.  Building on these sources this 
paper seeks to examine how Druze national identities have been both imagined and invented in 
Israel and the Golan Heights. 
 This study consists of four chapters and an epilogue.  The first chapter discusses the 
origins of the Druze and an overview of their history up to 1930 demonstrating long-established 
attitudes of the community toward political authority outside of their community.  The second 
chapter details both Zionist and Arab nationalist relations with the Druze in the Levant and how 
these relations evolved as both the Israeli and Syrian states were established.  This chapter also 
details the competition between Israelis and Syrian Arab nationalists to gain the loyalty of the 
Druze and integrate them into their polities.  The third chapter focuses on the development of the 
Israeli-Druze curriculum and the early years of Israeli occupation of the Golan-Heights as well as 
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Syria’s attempts to maintain influence in the Golan Heights after 1967.  The fourth chapter 
discusses the Golan-Druze’s rejection of Israeli citizenship and the multitude of ways in which 
Syria has reached out to them while detailing the growing influence of Arab nationalism among 
the Israeli-Druze.  The epilogue looks to the future of national identity and questions whether or 
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Interference and Resistance: The Druze in History 
The earliest studies of the Druze, or more accurately the muwḥḥidūn30 as they refer to 
themselves, tied the origins of the sect to a number of Semitic faiths predating Islam such as 
Mandaeism, Samaritanism, and Judaism.31  While the Druze traditions borrows many ideas from 
some of these preceding faiths the sect’s origins are found in the reign of the enigmatic Fāṭimid 
Caliph Al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh in Cairo.32  The Fāṭimid Caliph is best known for his strange 
behavior and his arbitrary policies, which included the order to kill all of the dogs in Cairo, a ban 
on the making of women’s footwear and the sale and consumption of mulukhiyya, and the 
resumption of sartorial requirements for Christians and Jews.33  The unusual and distinct 
character of al-Ḥākim combined with the anticipation of the imminent appearance of the mahdī, 
which was ubiquitous among Ismailis during the Caliph’s lifetime, led some to believe that al-
Ḥākim was the mahdī and later God.34   
 The precise year when faith in al-Ḥākim’s divinity began to develop in Cairo is difficult 
to narrow down, yet by the time it was first proclaimed publicly in 1017 it had already developed 
a sizeable following.  It did not take long for opposition to the new faith to become violent.  In 
January 1019 al-Akhram, a man considered by many scholars to be the first to publicly declare 
al-Ḥākim’s divinity, was murdered en route to visit the Caliph.35  Later that same year in June 
pogroms erupted against adherents to the inchoate sect in and around Cairo.  In the aftermath of 
the events of June, al-Ḥākim attempted to rectify the situation by firing the police chief in Fustat.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Translated	  from	  Arabic	  as	  either	  monotheists	  or	  Unitarians.	  	  	  31	  Hitti.	  24	  32	  Paul	  E.	  Walker,	  Caliph	  of	  Cairo:	  al-­‐Hakim	  bi-­‐Amr	  Allah,	  996-­‐1021	  (Cairo:	  The	  American	  University	  in	  Cairo	  Press,	  2009).	  	  252	  33	  Ibid.	  65	  34	  Kais	  Firro,	  "The	  Druze	  Faith:	  Origin,	  Development,	  and	  Interpretation,"	  Arabica	  (Brill),	  2011:	  76-­‐99.	  85	  35	  Walker.	  254	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While it appears that al-Ḥākim never formally endorsed the inchoate sect36 that would later 
become the Druze, he did seem to protect their right to continue to spread their message.37  In 
1021 al-Ḥākim disappeared while riding his donkey on the outskirts of Cairo.38  According to the 
Druze al-Ḥākim returned to his divine form again concealing himself from mortality; thus the 
lack of any evidence confirming al-Ḥākim’s death or whereabouts reinforced belief in his 
divinity.  With al-Ḥākim gone the Druze quickly became the target of the new regime’s hope of 
eradicating the memory of the strange Caliph. 
 The Caliph’s successor Abū Ḥasan al-Ẓāhir promptly repudiated any claims of al-
Ḥākim’s divinity and proclaimed that all those who held such a belief would be destroyed.39  The 
new Caliph unleashed a fury of persecution against the inchoate sect that reached as far away as 
Aleppo and Antioch forcing the Druze to go into seclusion.  After seven years in seclusion the 
Druze leaders Ḥamza and Bahā’ al-Dīn again resumed their missionary work in 1027.  
According to Druze scripture the new religion was preached throughout the world and Druze 
communities were established in the Levant, India, and Yemen although only the Levantine 
community remains today.40  Druze evangelizing continued until 1043 when it abruptly came to 
a halt and the Druze stopped accepting converts.41  It is at this time that the historian Phillip Hitti 
asserts, “The Druze religion ceased to be simply a religion and its followers became a distinct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  This	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  contention	  among	  scholars.	  	  Robert	  Brenton	  Betts	  asserts	  that	  al-­‐Ḥākim’s	  divinity	  was	  self-­‐declared;	  however	  Paul	  Walker	  disagrees	  noting	  that	  the	  most	  virulent	  opposition	  to	  the	  Druze	  came	  from	  al-­‐Ḥākim’s	  administration.	  	  	  37	  Ibid.	  246	  38	  The	  most	  widely	  held	  belief	  is	  that	  he	  was	  killed	  by	  hired	  hands	  of	  his	  sister	  Sitt	  al-­‐Mulk,	  despite	  the	  discovery	  of	  his	  hamstrung	  mule	  and	  his	  bloody	  robes	  there	  is	  no	  consensus	  about	  his	  fate.	  	  Christian	  tradition	  states	  that	  he	  received	  a	  vision	  castigating	  him	  for	  his	  ill	  treatment	  of	  Christians	  and	  he	  converted	  and	  lived	  out	  his	  days	  as	  a	  monk.	  	  Others	  contend	  that	  instead	  he	  instead	  sought	  a	  life	  of	  solitude	  and	  traveled	  east	  spending	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  days	  as	  a	  mendicant.	  	  Of	  course	  the	  Druze	  believe	  that	  he	  again	  took	  his	  divine	  form	  as	  an	  incomprehensible	  deity.	  	  For	  more	  detail	  see	  Walker	  p	  260-­‐261.	  39	  Nejla	  M.	  Abu-­‐Izzeddin,	  The	  Druzes:	  A	  New	  Study	  of	  their	  History,	  Faith,	  and	  Society	  (Leiden:	  E.J.	  Brill,	  1984).	  106;	  Walker.	  268	  40	  Abu-­‐Izzeddin.	  110	  41	  Firro.	  92	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nation.”42  After 1043 the Druze seem to disappear from history until the sixteenth-century 
appearing only briefly during the Crusades. 
In order to understand Druze society it is important to discuss certain elements of Druze 
theology.  Druze theology was heavily influenced by a variety of philosophies and theologies 
including Neo-Platonic philosophy, Gnosticism, Islam, Christianity and ancient Persian 
religion.43  Drawing from these ideologies the pioneers of the Druze movement adopted and 
emphasized that the scriptures and words of their prophets held both a literal and symbolic or 
allegorical meaning.44  Ẓāhir, the literal meaning, is openly shared with members of the Druze 
community while bāṭin, the esoteric or hidden meaning, is only available to those who are 
initiated into the inner-circle that comprises the Druze spiritual elite.45  This belief has bifurcated 
Druze society between the ‘uqqāl (initiated or wise) and the juhhāl (ignorant).46  Only the ‘uqqāl 
are allowed access to sacred texts and are allowed to attend the full worship service.   
The Druze view the five pillars of Islam as tenets for those who only accept the outward 
meaning of the Qur’an and have developed seven principles which supersede them and by which 
every Druze must abide.  These principles are: 1) truthfulness, 2) mutual aid to all Druze, 3) 
abandoning previous forms of worship, 4) renunciation of belief inconsistent with tawḥīd,47 5) 
belief that the doctrine of unity was preached in every age, 6) acceptance of God’s works 
whether good or ill, and 7) submission to God’s will.48  While not among the seven obligatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Hitti.	  12	  43	  Walker	  attributes	  the	  belief	  in	  al-­‐Ḥākim	  as	  God	  incarnate	  to	  Christian	  influences	  while	  Hitti	  asserts	  that	  this	  was	  the	  result	  of	  pre-­‐Islamic	  Persian	  religions.	  	  Abu-­‐Izzeddin	  goes	  into	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  how	  Neo-­‐Platonic	  thought	  played	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  Druze	  doctrine.	  	  See	  Walker	  p	  267,	  Hitti	  p	  32-­‐33,	  Abu-­‐Izzeddin	  p	  89-­‐96	  44	  Firro.	  	  “The	  Druze	  Faith:	  Origin,	  Development,	  and	  Interpretation.”	  84	  45	  The	  process	  of	  being	  initiated	  into	  the	  inner	  fold	  of	  the	  Druze	  is	  complicated	  and	  shrouded	  in	  secrecy	  and	  can	  last	  many	  years.	  	  See	  Robert	  Brenton	  Betts,	  The	  Druze	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1988).	  22-­‐23	  46	  Ibid.	  77	  47	  Strict	  Monotheism,	  tawḥīd	  encompasses	  the	  Druze	  belief	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principles of Druze theology secrecy has been important to the faiths longevity and survival 
through periods of intense persecution.  According to Nejla Abu-Izzeddin, “The secrecy is partly 
taqīyya, the concealment of ones religious affiliation when the person or community is in danger 
. . . A more important reason for secrecy is the concern to keep the faith from the reach of those 
who, being unprepared to accept its message, could misinterpret and corrupt its truth.”49  The 
Druze’s penchant for secrecy creates difficulties for non-Druze who study the sect.  Histories of 
the Druze are rife with rumors, speculations, and outright falsehoods due to the tendency toward 
secrecy of those who adhere to Druze theology.   
As the tenets of the young religion began to crystallize around 1043 Druze communities 
were largely relegated to the mountainous terrain that composes modern Lebanon, Syria, and 
Israel.  In these lands a feudal form of governance developed among the Druze community some 
time between the closing of the faith and the crusades.50  The Druze relied heavily on agriculture 
and developed a reputation as fierce warriors when provoked to violence.  Led by the powerful 
Tanūkh and Arslān families the Druze helped expel the Franks during the Crusades.51  In the 
disarray caused by the Crusades Druze chieftains carved small autonomous state in the hills 
along the coast of Syria and Palestine.52  The account of Benjamin Tudela, a Jewish adventurer 
who visited Palestine during the Crusades, attests to the fierceness and autonomy of the Druze. 
Ten miles there from a people dwell who are at war with the men of Sidon; they are called 
Druses, and are pagans of a lawless character.  They inhabit the mountains and the clefts of 
rocks; they have no king or ruler but dwell independent in these high places, and their border 
extends to Mount Hermon which is a three-days journey . . . they roam over the mountains 
and hills and no man can do battle with them.53 
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The Druze developed a reputation for being fierce warriors early on in their history.  They 
engaged in combat during the Crusades when it served their purposes and played a key role in 
driving the Europeans from Palestine.54As the Druze solidified their hold on the mountainous 
terrain in the hills of Syria they developed a reputation for rebelling against state authority.55 
 The Druze’s rebelliousness may stem from a divine mandate that forbids obedience to the 
commands of an unjust ruler.56  Druze rebellions against the state became more frequent in the 
years after the Ottoman conquest in 1516.  By 1523 the Ottoman governor of Damascus was 
waging campaigns against the Druze in attempts to bring them into compliance with the 
authorities in Istanbul.57  The Ottomans devastated the Druze community of the Shūf in 1523 and 
began targeting the leadership of the community in an effort to control the Druze.  In 1544 the 
governor of Damascus, Mustafa Pasha, invited the Druze emir Fakhr al-Dīn I to Damascus and 
when he arrived he had him killed.58  During the sixteenth century the Druze were in a state of 
constant rebellion against the Ottoman authorities refusing to pay taxes to the Sulṭan or accept 
his authority.59 During the middle years of the sixteenth-century the Ottoman governors of 
Damascus conducted a number of military campaigns against the Druze hoping to subdue their 
rebellious spirit.  Frustrated by their inability to rein in the indomitable Druze the Ottomans 
opened a massive campaign against the Druze in 1585 that included a naval assault on the coasts 
of Syria.60  The Ottoman military campaign crushed the Druze rebellion killing thousands, 
confiscating weapons, and collecting taxes.  Despite the success of the 1585 campaign Ottoman 	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control was short-lived as the Druze began to conduct trade agreements with Europe and amass 
firearms. 
 The rise of Fakhr al-Dīn II in the early seventeenth-century represents the height of Druze 
power and the level of contempt they felt toward the Ottomans.  As the Ottoman Empire began 
to decline feudal chiefs throughout Syria began to assert their autonomy.  ‘Ali Jānbulād, an 
ancestor of the powerful Junbalāṭ family in Lebanon, defied the Sulṭan and carved his own 
independent fiefdom stretching from Adana in the North to Hama in the South out of the 
Ottoman Empire.  He went so far as to mint his own coins and to order the recitation of his name 
during Friday prayer.61  With the Ottomans’ attention focused on Jānbulād’s affront to their 
authority, Fakhr al-Dīn quietly began building his own state in the Lebanese Mountains.  After 
crushing Jānbulād in 1609 the Ottomans turned their attention toward Fakhr al-Dīn who was 
forced to flee to Italy in 1613 leaving his kingdom under the control of his son only to return five 
years later.62 
  In the absence of Fakhr al-Dīn the local Ottoman authorities tried unsuccessfully to 
unseat al-Din’s family from their position in Shūf.  When Fakhr al-Dīn returned after five years 
in self-imposed exile most of his small kingdom remained intact.  Fakhr al-Dīn’s army 
decimated Ottoman forces sent from Damascus to unseat him in 1623.63  After capturing the 
Ottoman governor in Damascus Fakhr al-Dīn expanded his kingdom to include nearly all of 
greater Syria.64  During Fakhr al-Dīn’s reign agriculture flourished and a thriving silk trade 
developed with the merchant states of the Mediterranean.65  Fakhr al-Dīn’s independence from 
the Ottoman Sulṭan are reflected in his actions.  He openly welcomed Christians into this army, a 	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policy that would be condemned by the Ottomans.  His ultimate act of defiance came in 1631 
when he refused entry into Syria for the Ottoman army returning from an unsuccessful campaign 
to reclaim Baghdad.66  This act would eventually provoke the wrath of the Ottoman authorities, 
who would later turn their attention to Fakhr al-Dīn and the small state he had carved out from 
the Empire.  In 1633 Ottoman forces captured Fakhr al-Dīn and his two sons and returned Syria 
to the Sulṭan.67 
 Following the disposal of Fakhr al-Dīn II and his sons the Druze would continue to rebel 
against the Ottoman authorities from time to time but would never again experience the same 
level of success.  Later Druze rebellions in the seventeenth-century were triggered by tax 
collection and military service.68  The intrusiveness of the Ottoman authorities into the lives of 
the Druze declined in the eighteenth-century, a period of Druze history which is characterized by 
internal divisions.  At the end of the seventeenth-century the Druze Ma’n dynasty fell from 
power being replaced by the Sunni Shihāb family.  Following the death of the first Shihāb emir a 
dispute arose between the local factions and a battle ensued at ‘Ayn Dāra.69  This battle resulted 
in a large migration of Druze to the Ḥawrān plain in what is today southwestern Syria.  The 
Druze strength in Ḥawrān grew so much during the eighteenth-century that by its end the region 
began to be called the Jabāl al-Druze.  The upheavals in the Druze community continued as 
chieftains feuded over the leadership within the community.  The Junblāt family that is still 
prominent in Lebanon today rose to prominence at this time. 
 The turbulences of the nineteenth century brought with it a new wave of Druze rebellion 
against outside authority.  A fierce rivalry developed between the Druze Junblāts and their 	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follower and the Ottoman sanctioned Shihāb emirs at the outset of the nineteenth century and in 
1820 another Druze insurrection broke out.70  In 1825 Emir Bashīr Shihāb, aided by a Turkish 
army from Palestine, quelled the insurrection prompting more Druze to flee to the Ḥawrān.71  
Muḥammad ‘Alī’s occupation of Syria from 1833 to 1840 prompted another series of revolts 
against the state.  When Ibrāhīm Pasha requested new conscripts from Druze villages, the 
inhabitants refused saying that they would fight together but would not join the Egyptian army.72  
Armed resistance broke out first in the Ḥawrān and later in the foothills of Mt. Hermon in the 
Golan Heights.  The initial expedition sent to collect these new conscripts was decimated.73  
Eventually Ibrāhīm Pasha himself led an army of twenty thousand against the Druze.  During 
these revolts the Druze flocked to the besieged villages to assist their co-religionists in their 
fight.  Having exhausted his resources Ibrāhīm Pasha resorted to poisoning water sources and 
arming Christians in order to squash the Druze.74  
 Relations between Christians and Druze were strained in the early nineteenth century.  
The tension created by the rivalry between the Christian emir Bashīr Shihāb’s and the Druze 
Junblāts was exacerbated by the Egyptian administration’s decision to arm Christians in an effort 
to pacify the Druze of Syria.  After the British, acting on behalf of the Sultan, expelled Ibrāhīm 
Pasha’s army tension between Christians and Druze was on the rise.75  Worried by the Franco-
Maronite alliance many Druze chieftains encouraged an alliance with Britain for their 
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protection.76  During this period of tension the Druze still resisted Ottoman conscription requests.  
After a visit to the Ḥawrān, Richard Wood wrote to his superiors that the Druze chieftains there 
refused “to furnish a single recruit.”77   
In May 1860 violence between Christians and Druze erupted into a full-scale civil war in 
Mount Lebanon.  Druze from the Ḥawrān rushed to assist their brethren in the slaughter of 
Christians.78  By the time French forces arrived in Lebanon the Druze had dispatched over 
twelve thousand Christians.  Druze soldiers from the Ḥawrān coming to the aid of their 
coreligionists during the communal violence that erupted in 1860 is a good example of the unity 
with which the community acted before the emergence of the nation-state in the Levant.  For the 
sake of this work the united actions of the Druze in moments of stress is important, however the 
narrative used here simplifies the complex history behind this outbreak of sectarian violence 
between Christians and Druze which is beyond the scope of this paper.79  Following the events of 
1860 European influence and those Christians allied with Europe were in the ascendant in Mount 
Lebanon. 
 In the latter half of the nineteenth century the Druze in the Jabal al-Druze in the Ḥawrān 
maintained their autonomy despite Ottoman efforts to expand the state and reform the law.  
Periodically this led to minor clashes between Turkish troops and the Druze.  The Druze of the 
Ḥawrān developed and benefited from important commercial links with Damascus as the region 	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began to be incorporated into the Ottoman economy in the nineteenth century.80  In 1910 the 
Ottomans sent an army to the Ḥawrān in order to obtain new conscripts and collect taxes.  Druze 
leaders from Mount Lebanon traveled to the Ḥawrān in hopes of assisting their brethren in the 
situation.81  There was little resistance when the Ottoman army arrived in the Ḥawrān and they 
succeeded in collecting taxes and conscripts, however their prolonged stay and decision to 
disarm the Druze caused a stir among the Druze and the Ottomans arrested five sheikhs they 
accused of inciting rebellion.82   
Druze loyalty to the Ottoman state was precarious at the outbreak of World War I.  Druze 
conscripts such as Sulṭan al-Aṭrash fought alongside Ottoman soldiers despite a general distrust 
of Ottoman authority.  When the British sponsored Arab Revolt arrived in the Ḥawrān many 
Druze leaders agreed to join Fayṣal’s army on the condition that the Jabal al-Druze be granted 
autonomous self-rule.83  Despite the success of the Arab Revolt, Syria was turned over to the 
French shortly after the war. 
The French occupation of Syria divided Druze sympathies.  The Aṭrash family that had 
come to dominate Druze politics in the Ḥarwān openly opposed French rule going so far as to 
threaten a revolt of “30,000 able-bodied men” should the French try and maintain a military 
occupation of their lands.84  A draft of a proposed constitution for an independent Druze state in 
the Jabal al-Druze was submitted to the French in March 1921.  The constitution stated that: 
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“The Druze Government will accept financial and economic help from the French, but refuses to 
belong to an eventual unified Syria, except for commercial purposes.  The French have no right 
to interfere in the internal affairs of the Druze state, the native of which should not be liable to 
military service, nor to be disarmed.”85  The oppressive French mandatory administration failed 
to mollify the recalcitrant Druze and in 1925 the Druze leader Sulṭan al-Aṭrash instigated a 
rebellion in the Jabal al-Druze that would spread throughout Syria seriously threatening the 
mandate.86   
In June 1925 a delegation of Druze sheikhs petitioned the mandatory government 
requesting “basic law, an end to arbitrary judgment and imprisonment, the guarantee of personal 
freedom, and freedom of speech.”87  When these requests were ignored Sulṭan al-Aṭrash 
organized a political demonstration in front of the council building in Suwaydā on July 3rd.  The 
protest became violent and shots were fired when the French authorities tried to clear the Druze 
protesters from streets.  The next day attempts to mediate the conflict failed and the French 
demanded the payment of 100 Ottoman gold pounds and the detention of twenty Druze youths 
and one Ḥusayn Murshid.88  When it was discovered that Murshid had fled to Transjordan, the 
French authorities ordered the demolition of his home.  When news of this decision spread 
throughout the community a large number of armed Druze men from surrounding villages 
flocked to defend Murshid’s home.  Under the leadership of al-Aṭrash the Druze men forced the 
French authorities from the premises. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Farhan	  Sharaf,	  "Proposed	  Constitution	  of	  an	  Independent	  Druze	  State,	  March	  1921,"	  Minorities	  in	  the	  Middle	  
East:	  The	  Druze	  Community,	  1840-­‐1974,	  Vol.	  3,	  ed.	  Bejtullah	  Destani	  (Archive	  Editions	  Limited,	  2006),	  308.	  86	  During	  their	  colonial	  experiment	  in	  Mandate	  Syria	  the	  French	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  diversity	  that	  existed	  in	  region	  by	  reinforcing	  sectarian	  identities	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  dividing	  the	  population	  to	  prevent	  a	  united	  uprising	  against	  the	  French	  government.	  87	  Provence.	  53	  88	  	  Ibid.	  55	  
	   29	  
The French authorities determined the Aṭrash family was cause of the unrest and invited 
five of the Aṭrash sheikhs to Damascus to discuss the grievances of the Druze intending to arrest 
them on arrival.89  When news reached the Ḥawrān that three of the sheikhs had been arrested 
Sulṭan al-Aṭrash began calling for a general revolt and organizing a resistance movement.  On 22 
July the Druze attacked and decimated a French garrison near Suwaydā.90  News of the French 
defeat spread rapidly by word of mouth throughout Syria and ignited an uprising that by 
September 1925 spread to all of the major cities in mandate Syria.91  When news of the revolt 
reached the Druze in Palestine a group travelled to the Ḥawrān to assist their co-religionists in 
distress.92This conflict would continue until the spring of 1927 when the French were finally able 
to put down the insurrection that had begun in the Jabal al-Druze. 
At the eve of Arab independence the history of the Druze in relation to the state was 
characterized by rebellion and insurrection.  For the better part of four centuries of Ottoman rule 
the Druze had avoided both conscription and paying taxes and when the Ottomans were able to 
subdue Druze autonomy, it was nearly always short lived.  During their twenty-six year rule of 
Syria the French expended both blood and resources in large quantities to enforce their will on 
the Druze.  The resilience of the Druze lay not only in their fierce resistance to oppression but 
also in their strong tradition of communal solidarity.  This solidarity has been demonstrated by 
the Druze willingness to assist their coreligionists in conflict as evidenced in the communal 
violence of 1860.93  According to Druze academic Nejla Abu Izzeddin, “Solidarity is basic to 
Druze society and has deep roots.  A feeling of brotherhood pervades the community, which the 
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Druzes refer to as the community.94  The coming chapters demonstrate how the creation of the 































 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Abu-­‐Izzeddin.	  223	  
	   31	  
From Rebels to Citizens 
 
 The Great Syrian Revolt in 1925 established the strategic importance of the Druze for 
both Arab Nationalist and Zionist leaders.  The Druze history of autonomy and rebellion caused 
concern among both Arab nationalists and Zionists about how the Druze might react should a 
war break out between Arabs and the increasingly large Jewish population in Palestine.  These 
fears led to a competition between Arabs and Zionists for the hearts and minds of the Druze.  
Because the Druze did not fit neatly into the narrative the young Zionist cause, the Zionist 
leadership engaged in a process of securing Druze loyalty by granting economic privileges to the 
Druze, imagining a new shared history of the Druze, and reinforcing this imagined history 
through the invention of tradition.  In response the Arab Nationalist leaders continually asserted 
the Arabness of the Druze while reacting violently against elements of the community who 
appeared to either cooperate with the Jewish administration or remain neutral in the conflict.  
Due to the solidarity that existed among the Druze at this time the competition that developed 
between Arab nationalists and Zionists for their loyalty was directed toward the greater Druze 
community living in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.95  This chapter will discuss the competition 
between Arab Nationalists and Zionists for the hearts and minds of the Druze in both the years 
leading up to the 1948 War and their integration into the states of both Syria and Israel in the 
years after the war. 
Zionism and the Druze during the British Mandate 
 The Zionist administration in Palestine first took interest in the Druze after the French 
had quelled their rebellion in Syria in 1927.  The participation of Palestinian-Druze in the 
rebellion and the Syrian-Druze who sought refuge in Palestine was cause for concern.  Sulṭan al-	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Aṭrash, a prominent Druze and leader of the Syrian revolt, had championed the cause of Arab 
nationalism while leading the rebellious Druze during the upheaval and this caused the Zionists 
to reach out to him in hopes of securing his loyalty.96  In July 1930 the Jewish Agency sent Tuvia 
Ashkenazi to investigate the regions inhabited by the Druze.97  Ashkenazi expresses both Zionist 
fears of and interests in the Druze in his report to the Jewish agency noting the Druze’s dislike of 
Muslims and the likelihood of Druze fighting alongside other Arabs if a conflict were to occur 
and indicating the strength the Druze would bring to the Arab cause stating, “without the Druze, 
the Arabs are nothing.”98  As the probability of conflict grew so did efforts of Jewish agents to 
curry favor with the Druze. 
 In the early 1930’s disputes arose among the Druze over the future of the community in 
relation to the state.  While the Druze traveled freely to the villages of their co-religionists in 
Syria and Lebanon by the 1930’s it was apparent that the borders of the emerging states of Syria, 
Lebanon, and Israel would one day separate them.  Arab nationalist sympathies cultivated during 
the Syrian revolt were strong among segments of the community, however many Druze 
supported the traditional policy of independence.  Druze Sheikhs supported a variety of stances 
on the matter often dividing villages.  It was during this time that Zionist authorities first began 
building connections within the Palestinian-Druze community.99  Gambling on the success of the 
Zionist cause two chiefs from the Abū Rukun family, Ḥasan and Zayid, began collaborating with 
the Jewish Agency.100 
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As tensions rose in Palestine over the Jewish question, the Druze sought neutrality seeing 
the argument as being between Muslims and Jews.  When violence erupted in 1936 the majority 
of the Druze took a neutral stance and avoided participation in the conflict.  When the majority 
of the Druze did not join in the revolt, Arab nationalists distributed pamphlets in Druze villages 
in northern Palestine calling on them to unite in arms with the Arabs.101  Reacting to these calls, 
some Palestinian-Druze joined Arab gangs that surrounded Haifa.  A few bands of Syrian and 
Lebanese-Druze marched into Palestine and joined the Palestinian-Arabs in fighting against the 
British and Jews.102  The Jewish Agency directed Yosef Nahmani and Abba Hushi to engage the 
Druze in a propaganda campaign against the revolt, urging Druze neutrality.  Nahmani drafted a 
leaflet that was distributed in Druze villages in Northern Palestine.  These leaflets extolled the 
economic benefits of a Jewish presence in Palestine while mentioning the abuses that Muslims 
had perpetrated against the Druze in the past.  The pamphlet closed condemning Druze 
participation in the uprising while for the first time proclaiming an imagined past declaring that 
an, “understanding and a friendship had existed a long time ago between the Jews and Druze 
community.”103  This is a tactic the Zionist leadership, when dealing with the Druze, have 
continued to use emphasizing a historical friendship or shared past between the two 
communities. 
 A prominent Jewish academic Eliahu Epstein writing in Palestine and the Near East 
Economic Magazine echoed the sentiments of Nahmani.  In the article ‘The Druze people, Druze 
Community in Palestine: traditional friendship to the Jews’ Epstein painted the picture of two 
faiths sharing a common history of injustice at the hands of Arabs.  The article distanced the 
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Druze from Muslims and used the doctrine of taqīyya, the concealment of ones religious 
affiliation when in danger, to ease Jewish concerns over the similarity of the Druze to Muslims.  
He also drew on this doctrine to display similarities between the Marranos104 and the Druze.  
This article was not only directed toward the Druze, whom he hoped to ally with, but to Jews 
who were too leery to accept the Druze as potential friends after their limited participation in the 
bloody revolts of the previous two years.105 
Syrian and Lebanese-Druze involvement in the Arab-Palestinian uprisings in 1936, 
although half-hearted, reinforced the importance of the greater Druze community to Zionist 
goals.  A memorandum by Tuvia Cohen, a representative of the Jewish Agency to the Druze, in 
1937 expresses the desire of Zionists to build closer ties to the greater Druze community. 
This is the way - to establish spots of light and inspiration inside the dark Arab sea around us: 
one in Transjordan, a second in Lebanon, a third in Jabal Druze, a fourth elsewhere, etc. 
Perhaps we shall be able to consolidate them tomorrow into one bloc that will be inspired by 
us and will fortify our position. Only actions such as this will raise our image in the eyes of 
the major Arab governments and only they will force these rulers to take us into account as 
one of the principal factors in the Near East.106 
 
 The Druze community was integral to the plans of the Jewish Agency.  Not only because 
alienating the Druze from the Arab nationalists would mean they would have one less enemy to 
fight but also because the Druze held powerful positions in nascent states of both Syria and 
Lebanon.  As mentioned by Cohen, a Jewish friendly Druze community could be the means to 
securing favorable relations with their neighboring governments or at the very least they would 
be a potentially dangerous fifth-column in Syria and Lebanon if relations continued to remain 
antagonistic.  More importantly the Palestinian-Druze continued to look toward the Syrian-
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Druze for leadership and it was possible that if the Druze community sided with the Arab 
nationalist they could become a dangerous fifth-column in the young Jewish state.  With this in 
mind the Jewish agency renewed its efforts to pursue friendly ties with the broader Druze 
population. 
 As Arab efforts to stem the tide of Jewish immigration and expel the British continued to 
fail they began to direct their anger towards those who did not embrace the call to liberate 
Palestine.  The Druze communities in northern Palestine were singled out and were the victims 
of periodic violence propagated by Arab nationalists.  The Palestinian-Druze chiefs who had 
called for neutrality during the hostilities under the urging of Nahmani and Hushi now called on 
the Jewish Agency for protection.107  Toward the end of 1938 Abba Hushi began a series of 
negotiations, with the approval of the Abu Rukun family, with a Syrian-Druze named Yusuf al-
‘Aysami, who purportedly represented Sultan al-Aṭrash108, over the possible transfer of the 
Druze population in Palestine to the Jabal al-Druze in Syria.109  The transfer plan called for the 
Jewish Agency to purchase the land of the Palestinian-Druze while the Druze leadership in the 
Jabal al-Druze prepared new land and villages for the roughly 17,000 Palestinian-Druze 
relocating to Syria.  While negotiations between al-‘Asaymi and the Jewish Agency over the 
transfer plan continued sporadically for nearly seven years, it appears that they were never very 
close to reaching an agreement.110 
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 The prominence of the Jews in Palestine was on the rise in 1940s and this aided Zionist 
agents like Abba Hushi and Mordecai Shakhevitch in securing more contacts and support within 
the greater Druze community.  While support for the Zionist cause was gaining momentum 
among the Palestinian-Druze there is little evidence to suggest that there was much support for 
the Zionists in the Jabal al-Druze despite their efforts to reach out to Sultan al- Aṭrash.  Most 
Syrian-Druze remained neutral in regards to the Jewish presence in Palestine knowing that an 
openly antagonistic attitude could endanger their brethren in Palestine, who enjoyed neither 
their military strength nor communal independence.  By 1947 factions were hardening over the 
issue of Jews in Palestine, however most Druze still remained neutral. 
The 1948 War and Creation of the Israeli-Druze 
 In November 1947 the United Nations voted to partition Palestine into two Arab and 
Jewish states.  The decision was met by fierce opposition from the surrounding Arab states.  In 
December 1947 skirmishes broke out between Palestinians and Jews as the British prepared to 
withdraw from Palestine thus ending the mandate experiment.111  Pressure on Druze 
communities to align with either the Arabs or the Zionists increased as tensions between the two 
communities rose.  Fawzī Qāwuqjī, a veteran of the Syrian Revolt who had been exiled in 
Palestine during the French rule of Syria, toured the Jabal al-Druze that same December 
campaigning for the Palestinian cause and seeking recruits to fight in the nascent Arab 
Liberation Army or ALA.  According to a series of confidential telegraphs sent by he British 
consul in Damascus to the British Foreign office regarding the Druze and the issue of Palestine; 
it appears that Qāwuqjī’s mission yielded few recruits and the overall mood of the Druze was 
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one of neutrality.112  These telegraphs also reveal that the Druze of the Jabal al-Druze were not 
satisfied with the current government in Damascus and some favored siding with the Hashemite 
King Abdullah113 should a conflict arise between Syria and Transjordan.114  It is worth noting 
that Druze loyalty to Transjordan, where very few Druze lived possibly stemmed from the 
financial support King Abdullah had periodically distributed to the region through the Aṭrash 
family. 
 As violence escalated in Palestine the Druze for the most part remained neutral in the 
conflict.  At this time communal bonds remained more important than loyalty to either the 
Zionist or Arab nationalist cause.  This is demonstrated by the reaction of Shafa’amr, a pro-
Zionist Druze village, to the arrival of a Druze battalion associated with the ALA from Syria in 
March.  The villagers of Shafa’amr accommodated the Syrian Druze battalion despite pledging 
to their neighboring Jewish villages to remain neutral and to resist the urging of armed gangs.  
One villager expressed the contradiction felt by the community saying, “If Druze come how can 
we fight them rather than receive them.”115  The villagers attempted to dissuade the battalion 
commander Shakib Wahhab from attacking Jews but ultimately he led his soldiers into battle 
with the Hagana, the strongest of the Jewish militias. 
 Shakib Wahhab’s unit responded to a distress call from the respected Arab nationalist 
Qāwuqjī, who was commanding the ALA units, and attacked the Jewish settlement of Ramat 
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Yohanan hoping to divert the attention of the Hagana militia which was besieging Qāwuqjī’s 
unit on 6 April.116  Wahhab’s unit was initially successful, taking control of the settlement; 
however they were soon reengaged by the Hagana after a couple of days.  Paying a heavy price 
the Hagana was able to secure the villages and force the Druze to retreat after ten days of fierce 
combat.  The details of the Druze defeat are unclear as to why they failed.  Wahhab put the 
blame on the Arab leadership in Damascus due to their delayed response despite his calls of 
assistance.  Parsons mentions Wahhab’s tactical mistake of withdrawing to Shafa’amr after 
nightfall while only leaving a small contingent behind.117  The defeat left many of the Druze 
fighting in the ALA demoralized and many of them considered returning to their homes in 
Syria.  Building on their success with elements of the Palestinian-Druze community the Zionist 
leadership began to lobby these disaffected soldiers for their support while Arab nationalists 
desperately sought Druze assistance in the escalating conflict. 
After the Druze defeat by the Hagana the Jewish Agency arranged a secret meeting with 
the defeated Druze commanders through the pro-Jewish Druze. On 20 April leaders of both 
Druze and Zionist forces met at the Jewish settlement of Kiryat ‘Amal.  During the meeting 
Moshe Dayan, then the chief commander of Hagana and who would later become Israel’s 
minister of defense, suggested that the defectors from the Druze battalion could form a pro-
Jewish battalion and receive a salary from Jewish funds.118  As a result the members of the 
Druze battalion from Syria began abandon the cause.  The state of the battalion is reflected in a 
dispatch sent by Wahhab back to headquarters in Damascus on 3 May in which he claims, “We 
cannot maintain the situation unless you send reinforcements.”119  While the plan to form a 
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Druze unit to fight alongside Jews was delayed the majority of the Syrian-Druze soldiers had no 
intention of continuing their military campaign against the Jews. 
Aware that greater numbers of Druze were now favoring friendly relations with the Jews 
the Arab nationalists made a concerted effort to elicit support from the community.  Rasul 
Khatib set up a meeting with Druze leaders Salman Tarif and Salman Khayr in the village of 
Abu Snan in an effort to convince the Druze to support Qāwuqjī and the ALA.  Unable to 
convince the Druze leadership to join him, Khatib targeted the youth and campaigned for the 
Arab nationalist cause.  Aware of Khatib’s efforts Jewish intelligence made the decision to 
destroy his house later that year in order to send a message to Khatib and other nationalists 
working with the Druze.  These intentions are made clear in a Hagana intelligence dispatch 
declaring, “It should be hoped that Rasul Khatib will find out that his house was blown up and 
that he will find a connection between this and his activities among the Druze.”120 
 By May 1948 the Druze community had not reached a consensus in regards to their 
relationship with the nascent state of Israel.  The threats that the Jabal al-Druze could join 
Transjordan surfacing periodically in diplomatic dispatches, the Druze battalion in the ALA, 
and the Druze who favored Jewish interests all demonstrate the absence of a consistent national 
affiliation among the community at that time.  This also demonstrates that fractures in the 
national identification of the Druze were beginning to divide the community.  The efforts of the 
Jewish Agency operatives to imagine and invent a new Druze history is evident in the manner in 
which those operative spoke about the community.  Yet with a war brewing questions of loyalty 
regarding the Druze troubled both Jewish and Arab officials in Israel and Syria.   
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 The Arab nationalist activities in the Druze community were cause for alarm for the 
Jewish Agency operatives who had been cultivating friendly relations with the community for 
nearly two decades.  The incipient state of Israel entered into negotiations with the Palestinian-
Druze about how they could cement the community’s loyalty.  Many Palestinians including the 
majority of the Druze heavily relied on the profits of the harvest for their living.  The summer 
harvest became a tool by which Israel could court the Druze.121  The Israeli Defense Force 
adopted a policy of harvesting Palestinian crops themselves and destroying those which they 
were not able to reap, and at the same time attacking the Palestinian fallāḥīn who attempted to 
harvest their crops.  This policy forced many Palestinians desperate for food and security to 
abandon their lands and flee to neighboring Arab states.122  Israel used this policy to privilege 
the Palestinian-Druze above other Palestinian-Arabs.  Those Druze villages that agreed to 
continue their policy of neutrality in the conflict were granted access to their fields and even 
supplied with tools and other necessities to complete the summer harvest.  The political 
calculations of the Israeli authorities fulfilled their purpose.123  Economic manipulation of the 
Druze community would quickly become a cornerstone of Israel’s policy toward the minority 
sect.  
 The harvest policy aided the Israeli authorities greatly in their quest to win the loyalty of 
the Druze community.  A number of Druze villages surrendered to the IDF without a fight and 
soon after enjoyed harvesting their crops.  By the end of the July the issue of Druze soldiers in 
the IDF was revisited and received with a favored response.  By August Israeli officials decided 
to form a Druze unit under Jewish leadership to fight in the IDF.  This initial unit consisted of 
211 Syrian-Druze who had defected from Wahhab’s unit and some Druze youth from the 	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villages of Daliyat al-Carmel and Isfiya.124  The important role that the “Minorities Unit” played 
in the IDF’s military campaign in Galilee helped to legitimize the efforts of those in the young 
Israeli government who advocated working with the Druze.125  The success of the “Minorities 
Unit” led to its expansion and by 1949 there were roughly 400 Druze serving in the IDF.  As the 
Druze were slowly being integrated into the IDF Arab nationalists extended their efforts to 
convince the Druze to join their cause. Throughout 1948 nationalist leaders actively campaigned 
for Druze assistance and sent representatives to recruit soldiers in their villages.  These attempts 
yielded few new supporters of the Palestinian cause and the majority of the Palestinian-Druze 
continued to remain neutral in the conflict.126   
 The Druze motivations for serving in the IDF and the ALA were varied.  It appears that 
the Druze’s decision to join the IDF was a pragmatic one.  The Zionist forces were in the 
ascendant and the Arab forces were increasingly divided.  Service in the IDF also included 
economic benefits for a community that maintained a traditional way of life that was becoming 
increasingly difficult to continue. The majority of the Druze lived an agrarian lifestyle focused 
around farming.  There was limited access to modern forms of education and therefore little 
opportunity in choosing a career.  Subsistence farming was becoming less and less feasible and 
military service became a path to economic success.127  The Druze serving in the IDF were 
granted economic benefits that extended to their families hence enriching their villages.  These 
benefits included obtaining licenses to transport and sell food, and travel freely throughout the 
region.128  Through their control of the harvest and the offer of military service to the Druze, the 
Israeli authorities had many economic enticements for the Druze community.  Building on these 	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economic issues Israeli authorities embarked on a new phase of re-shaping Druze history and 
creating an invented identity- turning the imagining of the Israeli-Druze into a reality. 
The most important maqām or shrine for the Druze in Israel lies near the abandoned 
village of Hittin and is dedicated to al-Nabī Shu‘ayb, the Biblical character Jethro.129  This 
shrine became a focal point of the Israeli authorities’ relationship with the Palestinian-Druze.  
The first Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, visited the site in his first meeting with the 
Druze leadership in November 1948.  The Israeli Prime Minister used the occasion to emphasize 
the historical connection that the Druze share with the Jews through al-Nabī Shu‘ayb.  In 
December the shrine was used for a ceremony for new recruits being sworn into the IDF.130  
Following a number of visits to the shrine the Israeli Minister of Religions, Tuvia Cohen, saw 
the potential al-Nabī Shu‘ayb could have in cultivating an Israeli friendly identity with the 
Druze.  Writing in a report on one of his visits Cohen expressed his interest in the shrine for 
political purposes. 
When dealing with people who live in the Middle East, one should always take into account 
that there is no difference between religion and politics.  Thus it is indispensable to recall that 
factors of religion can be transformed into extremely valuable factors of politics.  Take, for 
example the shrine of “nabi al-Shu‘ayb,” which is in Israel. This site is most sacred to all 
Druzes, much like the sanctuary of Mecca for Muslims.  This gives Israel an extraordinary 
tool by which to prove, both religiously and politically, its attitude towards the Druze 
community, which makes it a primary instrument for propaganda to prepare the ground for 
potential developments in the near future among the Druzes.131 
 
 Through 1949 the Israeli authorities gave financial assistance to the custodians of the 
Shrine, the Tarif family, to restore and promote it.  Traditionally pilgrimages to the shrine were 
low key and attended by few, but the Israeli authorities actively promoted the pilgrimage in 1949 
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enlisting Druze recruits in the “Minorities Unit” to publicize it.  A parade and feast were held in 
tandem with the pilgrimage which also was attended by Israeli officials.132  This newly invented 
tradition was held annually and always attended by high ranking Israeli officials.  Israel’s 
political use of the shrine was intended to reach not just those within the state’s border but also 
the Druze in neighboring Lebanon and Syria reflecting the administration’s view of the sect as a 
single entity. 
 In 1949, Tuvia Cohen echoed earlier sentiments urging Israeli officials to use their 
connections within the local Druze community to reach out to the Druze as a whole as a means 
of solidifying the Jewish state regionally.  In the minds of the Druze advocates within the Israeli 
government the Druze were “a single, separate entity, different from the population among 
which they live.”133  The decision makers in Israel saw the community in this manner: 
We should see the Druze community in Israel as an integral part of the whole community in 
the Middle East whose number is about 250,000 souls.  Until now there are close relations 
between Druze communities in Syria, Lebanon and Israel.  Frequently common meetings are 
held between them, especially between religious chiefs, in order to deal with essential 
problems concerning the whole community, including taking up a common position vis-à-vis 
new forces acting in the political arena.134 
 
In the 1950’s the Palestinian-Druze community was rapidly becoming the Israeli-Druze 
as their ties relationship with the Jewish Authorities were strengthened.  Despite their success 
with the Israeli-Druze the state’s efforts to invent a parallel Druze identity within the framework 
of a Jewish state did not reap the same fruit in the greater Druze community.  Druze allegiance in 
Israel heavily relied on economic and political advantages.  The history of the Druze as imagined 
by the Israeli authorities and the accompanying invented traditions that corresponded to this past 
arguably had less to do with Druze loyalty than the benefits of collaborating with Israelis.  Druze 
leaders like the Tarif family gained power within the Druze circle through the elevation of the al-	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Nabī Shu‘ayb shrine and the promotion of its pilgrimage.  The other leaders in the Druze 
community were supported by MAPAI, the leading political party in Israel, and with its help, 
some politically motivated Druze were able to win seats in the Knesset.135  Druze cooperation 
with Israeli authorities also opened economic doors in two sectors of the Israeli economy: the 
construction industry and the military.  While it is difficult to tell how much of an influence the 
offer of an imagined shared past between the Druze and Jews played in winning Druze 
sympathies, it is impossible to discount the economic pragmatism involved in the decision of 
large segment of the Druze community to ally with the new state. By 1956 the Israeli-Druze 
were well on their way to full integration into the Jewish state as evidenced by the Druze 
demands that the same conscription laws for Jews be applied to the Druze.136  Some Israeli-
Druze disagreed with this decision but there is little evidence of any large numbers of the 
community who refused to be considered candidates for military service. 
State Building in Syria and the Integration of the Druze 
The integration of the Syrian-Druze into the Syrian state was much rockier than that of 
their coreligionists in Israel. Under the leadership of the Aṭrash clan the Druze revolted against 
French rule and liberated the Jabal al-Druze one year before independence in 1946.  At the time 
of independence the Syrian-Druze comprised the most competent military force in Syria leading 
President Shukrī al-Quwatlī to label them a “dangerous minority.”137  Threats from Sultan al-
Aṭrash to attack Damascus compelled al-Quwatlī to apologize for his remarks.  Attempting to 
reconcile with the Druze, President al-Quwatlī invited al-Aṭrash to participate in a parade 
celebrating Evacuation Day on 17 April 1946.  Aṭrash refused to attend unless al-Quwatlī agreed 	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to recognize him as the most prominent Arab nationalist for his role in the 1925 revolt against 
the French.  This was the first sign that the Druze wanted preferential treatment from the Syrian 
government. 
Amīr Ḥasan al-Aṭrash, the governor of the Jabal al-Druze and a relative of Sultan, pushed 
President al-Quwatlī to allocate a large portion of the budget for the Jabal al-Druze.  
Negotiations between Ḥasan al-Aṭrash and the Syrian minister of the interior reveal that he 
expected increased funding for education and numerous other development projects.  Among 
them was a plan that would create networks of roads connecting all the villages of the Jabal al-
Druze with the capital Suwwayda.138  Additionally he wanted a number of government jobs 
reserved for the Druze.  President al-Quwatlī was outraged by the demands of Druze leaders and 
refused to give into their demands.  The failure of the Damascus government to acquiesce to 
their demands, often prompted the Aṭrashs to threaten that they would secede from Syria and 
become part of Transjordan.139  However, British diplomatic cables reveal that this was never a 
serious option for the Druze. 
President al-Quwatlī directed most of the money going to the Jabal al-Druze to 
destroying the Aṭrash’s hold on the province.  In 1947 Quwatlī courted and later funded a group 
of lesser Druze chiefs who were willing to challenge Aṭrashs’ control of the Jabal al-Druze.140  
These lesser chiefs organized militias and attempted to intimidate the Aṭrash’s and their 
supporters.  British diplomatic cables reveal that a quasi civil war developed in the Jabal al-
Druze between the Aṭrash’s and the upstart chiefs.  The Atrashs repeatedly accused the 
government of intervening in the Jabal al-Druze and attempting to split the community however 
there was little outside help.  By 1949, the Aṭrashs had beaten back the pro-Quwatlī Druze and 	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solidified their hold on the province.  The Druze dissatisfaction with Damascus continued over 
the next several years. 
The leadership of the Aṭrashs and their suspicion toward Damascus hampered efforts to 
convince the Syrian-Druze to relinquish their semi-autonomy in the Jabal al-Druze.  Syrian 
President Adīb al-Shīshaklī was careful not to make the same mistakes as his predecessor in 
relation to the Druze.141  When Shīshaklī rose to power through a military coup in 1949, the 
Jabal al-Druze still maintained a considerable degree of autonomy under the leadership of the 
Aṭrash family.  Shīshaklī’s methods of state-building in some ways mirrored that of the French.  
As president he used both coercive force and economic development as tools to integrate 
communities he felt were not committed to the state of Syria.142  The Syrian-Druze expectations 
of preferential treatment from Damascus clashed with Shīshaklī’s desire to abolish communal 
identities and replace them with a greater Syrian identity.143  During the first year of his rule 
Shīshaklī built up the military in order to enforce his vision of Syria. 
Shīshaklī’s vision of Syria included a subjugated and integrated Jabal al-Druze.  The 
President was known to say that, “My enemies are like a serpent: the head is the Jabal Druze, the 
stomach Homs, and the tail Aleppo. If I crush the head the serpent will die.”144  Shīshaklī’s focus 
on “crushing the head of the serpent” involved eliminating the relative economic independence 
the Jabal al-Druze enjoyed through the smuggling trade, the hashish trade, and occasional 
financial assistance from King Abdullah.  Shīshaklī curtailed the smuggling activities of the 
Druze by placing his brother in charge of the border police strengthening the security apparatus.  	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Simultaneously Shīshaklī refused to develop the infrastructure of the Jabal al-Druze limiting the 
ability of Druze farmers to compete with better developed regions in northern Syria.145  
Shīshaklī’s regime purged the Syrian army of high ranking Druze officers forcing them into 
retirement and refusing to promote other Druze officers on the rise.  The build up of the Syrian 
army between 1949 and 1951 and the relegation of the Druze to a minor position in the army left 
Shīshaklī confident that he could use the army to quell any discontent that would arise from the 
Jabal al-Druze.  In the years after 1951 Shishalki’s regime targeted the Druze leadership 
accusing a number of prominent Druze of spying for Israel while waging a propaganda war 
against the minority community.  During this time many Druze leaders were arrested in large 
numbers and many others fled to Transjordan.  The vast majority of Syrians tried for espionage 
during Shīshaklī’s presidency were Druze.   
Shīshaklī’s policies toward the Jabal al-Druze had developed a strong sense of resentment 
in the Jabal al-Druze.  Many Druze including the sons of Sultan al-Aṭrash joined the opposition 
Ba’th party and openly campaigned against the central government.  In 1953 Shīshaklī crushed a 
revolt in the Jabal al-Druze and arrested all the traditional Druze leaders again announcing 
publicly that the Druze were spies and dangerous.  Shīshaklī’s actions sparked widespread 
demonstrations in Druze villages throughout Israel demanding an end to the repression of their 
co-religionists in Syria.146  Once the threat of an uprising in the Jabal al-Druze subdued Shīshaklī 
continued his policies that were becoming increasingly unpopular in Syria.  On 25 February 
1954 a military uprising originally planned by Druze army officers with Ba’th party affiliations 
in Dayr al-Zur began in northern Syria.  By the end of the day Shīshaklī had fled the country.147  
While Shīshaklī and his policies toward the Druze were gone the damage to the community’s 	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political power and autonomy was irreversible.148  The economy of the Jabal al-Druze was 
unable to recuperate following the coup and many Druze were forced to search for work 
throughout Syria more fully integrating the Druze into Syria.  Numerous Syrian-Druze leaders 
continued to exercise significant political influence through their growing relationship with the 
Ba’th party.149   
Nationalist Imaginings and the Druze in Propaganda 
As it appeared that Druze relations with the Syrian government were improving 
following the coup in the 1954, a propaganda campaign between Arab nationalists and Zionists 
for the loyalty of all Druze factions was emerging.  The growing relationship between Syrian 
leadership and the Druze leadership was disconcerting for members of the Israeli administration 
who had been worried about the influence of a staunchly pro-Syrian Druze community in the 
Jabal on the Palestinian-Druze.150  By 1956, pro-Israeli and pro-Syrian pamphlets were being 
distributed in Druze villages in Israel and the Jabal al-Druze.  Both pro-Israeli and pro-Syrian 
pamphlets urged the Druze to remain loyal to their noble traditions and their past.  Of course the 
rendition of Druze tradition and history varied according to the viewpoints of the differing 
political tracts.   
 Toward the end of 1956 copies of a leaflet purportedly from Sultan al-Aṭrash and two 
other prominent Syrian-Druze were being circulated around Druze villages in Israel.  They were 
designed to combat the recent decision to make all Druze men eligible for IDF conscription.  The 
arguments in the pamphlet hailed the struggle of the Arab peoples against the “colonialists and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  Ibid.	  149	  Itamar	  Rabinovich,	  Syria	  Under	  the	  Ba'th	  1963-­‐66	  (Jerusalem:	  Israel	  Univesity	  Press,	  1972).	  11	  150	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  coup,	  Hasan	  al-­‐Aṭrash	  was	  wooed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  Syrian	  political	  parties	  and	  was	  awarded	  the	  post	  of	  Secretary	  of	  Agriculture.	  	  Other	  Druze	  who	  ran	  for	  office	  won	  sweeping	  victories	  in	  the	  elections	  following	  the	  coup.	  
	   49	  
Zionists” and accused the Zionists of sowing communal dissention among the Arabs.151  The 
message of the pamphlet goes on to attack those Druze who serve in the IDF saying, “Those 
agents and hirelings in the service of Israel are despised by Israel herself for cooperating with her 
and for their disloyalty to the Arab cause by volunteering to join her forces to fight their brethren 
on the Palestine borders.”152  The pamphlet then urges the Druze to unite with their Arab 
brothers and oppose the Zionists while giving a few examples of Israel’s lack of respect for the 
Druze community.  The pamphlet closes by praising the proud tradition of the Druze and their 
place in the struggle against all forms of colonialism:  
The allegation that the Druses in Syria are being persecuted is false and is a colonial plot to 
weaken Druse resistance.  The Druse in Syria will always be inflammable material for any 
Arab revolt against colonialism.  It is hoped that this attitude will serve to guide the Israel 
Druses, who are expected to take a stand compatible with the prestige of all Druses, gained by 
their struggle against colonialism and Zionism, thus refuting all Israel allegations and 
deceitful propaganda.153 
 
 Upon discovering the pamphlets the British Consul in Haifa doubted it was written by 
Sultan al-Aṭrash.  However the pamphlet clearly attempts to paint the Druze as valiant defenders 
of Arab nationalism and condemn Druze service in the IDF.  It also constructs a Druze history 
that connects the Druze to a larger Arab community.  Finally the pamphlet makes no mention of 
the tremendous persecution of the Druze at the hands of the previous Syrian regime until near the 
end where it neatly glosses over the treatment of Druze in Syria implicating these allegations as 
part of a “colonial plot.”  News of the pamphlet quickly reached the Israeli authorities and there 
was a quick and cunning response. 
 In the early months of 1957 a pamphlet purportedly from the Free Druze Association 
appeared in villages in northern Israel and the Jabal al-Druze in Syria.  According to a British 	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foreign service officers stationed in Haifa the pamphlet was “undoubtedly from Israel and […] it 
was dropped from an unidentified plane over the Jebel el Druze and Israel.”154  The writer of the 
pamphlet claims to be from Syria and consistently bemoans the troubled situation of the Druze 
there.  The author opens the pamphlet describing the Druze as a peaceful, patriotic, and religious 
people who are persecuted because of their faith: 
We, the Druses, have been subjected in Syria to severe persecution throughout our long 
history, which is full of persistent struggles for the preservation of our existence and our 
traditions as a sect, which has it own particular traditions, but this did not suit the non-Druse 
sects.  We wished to live with them in peace and tranquility but they denied us this.  We are 
all the time defenders of independence and the first to respond to the country’s call but in 
spite of that we have suffered in our homes at the hands of our countrymen.155 
 
  The author then continues to praise the role of the Druze in the Syrian revolution and in 
throwing off the shackles of colonialism.  He then lists the Syrian government’s crimes against 
the Druze community; among them are incarceration, torture, and the death penalty against their 
leaders.  He goes on to imply that the Syrian government has some enmity against the Druze 
accusing the government of levying prison sentences against the Druze in both Lebanon and 
Israel.156  The author also constantly alludes to the Druze’s persecution that characterized their 
past and presents it as naturally following from the intolerance of their Muslim neighbors.  After 
detailing all of the Syrian regime’s crimes against the Druze the author closes by praising the 
Druze’s militant past declaring, “We have gained in our history a glory which frightens our 
enemies, although we are few, as they claim.”157 
 The exact source of this pamphlet is unknown, however the ability to fly a plane over 
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Israeli involvement.  The author is clearly not a Syrian-Druze, since at the time in which the 
pamphlet was written and distributed the Syrian government’s persecution of the Druze minority 
had come to a halt.  The pamphlet’s aim appears to be to emphasize the peculiar nature of the 
Druze sect and the importance of communal identity while contrasting that identity against the 
Arab nation.  The author refers many times to the patriotic history of the Druze and their 
willingness to fight for their country.  Finally, it appears that the pamphlet was an appeal for 
Syrian-Druze to rise up against the government. 
 The rising popularity of the new face of Arab nationalism, Gamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir, was 
again cause for concern for the Israeli administration and in July, 1958 a pamphlet titled, “An 
Appeal to Druses” coming from Ben-Ami Gourevitch, president of a Zionist organization, was 
distributed to the Druze in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel.  This pamphlet appeared in the wake of 
Nāṣir’s successful formation of the United Arab Republic which united Syria and Egypt.  What 
was even more disconcerting for the Israeli leadership was that prominent Lebanese Druze leader 
Kamāl Junbalāṭ publicly supported the union advocating Arab nationalism in Lebanon.  Fears 
that Lebanese and Syrian Druze sentiment could spill over into the Israeli-Druze communities 
prompted Gourevitch to paint Nāṣir as a very dangerous person saying that he wanted to, 
“annihilate the Druse” after he got rid of the Jews and the Maronites.158  Gourevitch then urges 
the Druze to emulate their great historical leader Fakhr al-Din and rise up against  Nāṣir and the 
Arabs.  Throughout the short tract he continually differentiates the Druze from the Arabs and 
even asserts that the Druze currently “suffer under the Arab yoke.”  The pamphlet encourages the 
Druze in Syria to assert their autonomy in the Jabal al-Druze.  In closing Gourevitch ties the fates 
of the Druze to Israel and asserts that together they can defeat the danger that is Nāṣir 	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exclaiming, “long live the state of Israel, long live a free and united Lebanon, and long live a 
Druze state in Djebel al-Druze.”159 
 There is a common theme in both these tracts which is the oppression of the Druze and 
the glorification of their history.  Both the Arab nationalists and the Zionists constantly refer to 
the Druze as being victims of the oppression of the other.  The Arab nationalists constantly refer 
to the Zionists as a form of colonialism that seeks to undermine the Druze’s glorious history and 
exploit them.  Conversely the Zionists insist that the Druze are not entirely Arab and like their 
Jewish allies have always been persecuted by their Arab neighbors.  Thus the Druze and the Jews 
share a past and likely a common destiny.  The propaganda battle continued to be waged for the 
hearts and minds of the Druze by the Arab nationalists and the Israelis.  These propaganda wars 
gave the Druze two “imagined histories” with corresponding communities to which they could 
adhere.  Meanwhile economic interests were slowly pulling the members of the Druze 
communities into the orbits of these “imagined identities” as either Israelis or Syrians. 
Economics and Integration 
 In Israel the traditional economic interests of the Druze community were tied to the land 
on which they lived.160  By the mid-1950s the state of Israel had established itself and begun a 
series of land reform policies that slowly stripped the indigenous Arab population (this includes 
the Druze) of large chunks of land.  Over the next decade land expropriation policies 
methodically and systematically confiscated Druze lands undermining their traditional agrarian 
lifestyle.  Despite attempts to resist these land policies the encroaching state powers were 
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unyielding.161  As the Druze lost their farmland they also lost their ability to compete with the 
emerging Jewish farms.  State policies favored farms run by Jews setting prices that pushed 
many Arab and Druze farmers out of business.162 In the words of an Israeli-Druze scholar, “It 
signaled the onset of a process that in the early 1950s was to alienate the Druzes from agriculture 
on which the community had thrived traditionally and steer them into a direction that would 
make them ever more dependent on the dominant economy of the Jewish state.”163 
While the Israeli-Druze were slowly losing land the state of Israel was undertaking 
massive development projects, creating a need for manual labor that could attract the Druze who 
were not serving in the military.  Work in the private sector and service in the armed forces 
brought the Druze in greater contact with Jewish citizens of the state and personal relations were 
being formed between the two communities.  The difficulty of finding work in their home 
villages pushed the Druze to rely heavily on the state for employment either through military 
service or state projects.  Dependence on the state for work limited the ability of the Israeli-
Druze to outwardly resist state imposed identities.  Although Arab nationalist movements arose 
within the Israeli-Druze community they were often undermined by Druze Knesset members 
who benefitted from their connections to the ruling MAPAI party.164 
A similar process with the Druze was occurring in Syria.  After Shishakli’s dismantling 
of the Jabal al-Druze’s economy, service in the military became an expedient means of providing 
for oneself.  The rise of the Ba’th party in the 1950’s and the tightening of their grip on the 
country after the dissolution of the UAR in 1961 benefitted the Druze greatly.  During these 
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years the ranks of the Ba’th party became swollen with minorities such as the Druze and the 
‘Alawites.165  The Druze proximity to power through their growing ranks in the military gave 
them a greater stake in the fate of the country.  A Syrian-Druze identity was in full development 
by the mid-1960’s with a new war just on the horizon. 
As the nation-states of Syria and Israel emerged in the aftermath of World War II the 
Druze became a coveted ally of both Arab nationalists and Zionists.  The Druze tradition of 
confessional autonomy clashed with invitations to openly ally themselves with either side and 
instead the Druze opted for neutrality.  While both Israel and Arab nationalists have engaged in 
imagining identities for the Druze, neither have been entirely successful and these imagined 
identities have been challenged by both Arabs and Zionists in reaction to each other.  While 
Israel has attempted to create an identity that separates the Druze from their Arab heritage and 
emphasizes a shared heritage with the Jews, the Arab nationalists have depicted the Druze has 
valiant defenders of the Arab nation and Arabs.  The economic integration of both Israeli-Druze 
and Syrian-Druze has as a result increased interaction between the Druze and the national society 
in which they live. This, in turn, has increased their exposure to new national identities that have 
subsequently been embraced, or so it seems, by the two communities.  As Israel failed to keep its 
promises to the Druze community, the Arab nationalist began to gain greater support within the 
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In the Classroom: Intellectuals and the Identity Debate 
 
 The foundation upon which the Israeli government built its relationship with the Druze 
community showed signs of crumpling throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s as promises to the 
community remained unfulfilled and Arab nationalists persisted in their attempts to undermine 
Israeli efforts to create an imagined history of the Israeli-Druze.  In 1967, the Israeli authorities 
embarked on a new campaign to win the support of four more Druze villages following the take 
over of the Golan Heights despite a coalescing resistance to Israel’s Druze policies in the Galilee.  
Unwilling to accommodate the growing demands of the Israeli-Druze community the state 
embarked on a campaign to reform Druze education to inculcate the next generation of Druze 
with a love of Israel and a sense of patriotic duty.166  This chapter will discusses the success and 
failures of Israel’s attempts to manipulate Druze identity through the education system while 
simultaneously attempting to integrate the four Druze villages of the Golan Heights into the 
state. 
Resistance and the Formation of the Israeli-Druze Intelligentsia 
 By the 1960’s the Israeli government’s efforts to separate the Druze from the Arab 
community had proved mostly superficial and ineffective.  The establishment of the Druze 
religious courts and the conscription of all Druze males into the IDF were exceptions to how the 
government chose to deal with the Israeli-Druze community.167  The vast majority of Druze 
affairs were handled in the same manner as those of Muslim and Christian Arabs.  After 1948 the 
Israeli government treated the Druze as more of “a less persecuted minority” rather than a 
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partner in building the new state.168  The failure of Israeli authorities to address the predicament 
of the Druze community led some within the community to sympathize with and embrace 
elements of the Arab nationalist movement and to oppose Israel’s Druze narrative.  Educated 
alongside Arab Christians and the Muslims, many Druze became better acquainted with the 
tenets of Arab nationalist ideology through their experience in the school system. 
 The Israeli-Druze community benefited greatly in the first decade of Israel’s rule as 
access to education improved with the expansion of the state.  The Israeli authorities made 
primary education compulsory and strongly encouraged the Druze to attend through high school.  
As a result literacy rates in Druze villages increased greatly.  According to the 1961 census only 
fifty percent of Druze were literate, however the literacy rate for those aged nineteen or younger 
was ninety-two percent.169  The increase in literacy enabled many within the community to 
expand their political views beyond the narrative of the village elders aligned with the state.  As 
a result the numbers of Israeli-Druze participating in debates on the role of the community in 
Israel began to grow.  The gradual formation of a young Druze intelligentsia challenged the 
traditional Druze leadership and their ties to the state.  In the early years of the state the Druze 
education was overseen by the ministry of minorities.  The Druze attended school with and were 
exposed to the curriculum designed for Circassians, Arab Christians, and Arab Muslims.  These 
schools were typically dominated by Arab teachers who often espoused Arab nationalism and 
other leftist ideologies.  Arab nationalism was often disseminated in some form in the classroom 
despite not being apart of the officially sanctioned curriculum.170  Support for Arab nationalism 
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and resistance to Israel’s policies toward the Druze community increased among the young and 
educated Druze. 
 The Druze intelligentsia adopted political stances left to those of the village sheikhs and 
often challenged their authority.  Samīh al-Qāsim, the Druze intellectual and poet, made news in 
July 1960 when Israeli authorities arrested him for refusing to enlist in the IDF.  In response a 
series of articles emphasizing the history of conflict between Druze and Arab Christians 
appeared in the government run al-Yūm.171  The intelligentsia challenged the basis of these 
articles and accused Israelis of trying to drive a wedge between the Druze and the Arabs.172  The 
next year a number of Druze intellectuals established Munaẓamat al-Shābāb al-Durūz (The 
Druze Youth Organization).  The leadership of the Druze Youth Organization criticized Israeli 
efforts to separate the Druze from the Arabs and promoted the Arab character of the Druze.  The 
views echoed those of the powerful Lebanese-Druze leader Kamāl Junbalāṭ who established 
himself as arguably the most politically influential Druze in the fifties and sixties.173  The 
organization also sought to wrest control of the community from the tribal leaders who were 
complicit in the state’s policies regarding the Druze.  Students and educated Druze formed the 
foundation of the Druze Youth Organization’s support but despite the grievances of the 
community the organization was never able to garner much support beyond its small base.174 
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 By the 1960’s the Druze sheikhs who had collaborated with the state and distanced 
themselves from the Israeli-Arab community exercised a significant amount of political power in 
the state.  The Druze Youth Organization had never seriously threatened to unseat the entrenched 
pro-Israeli leadership of the Druze community but its activity had caught their attention.  Toward 
the end of the 1960’s the pro-Israel faction of the Druze community began calling for reform in 
the education system.  These requests initially involved replacing Arab Christian and Arab 
Muslim teachers with Druze teachers in schools with large Druze populations and later led to 
demands for their own school system.  Before the state could act on these demands the Israeli 
government brought a new community of Druze under their authority with the occupation of the 
Golan Heights following the 1967 war.  
The 1967 War and the Creation of the Golan-Druze 
 Arab nationalist rhetoric and Israel’s aggressive and at times offensive defense of their 
borders inched the region ever closer to conflict in the 1960’s and in June 1967 war erupted 
between the Jewish state and her Arab neighbors.  During the brief conflict the more hawkish 
leaders within the Israeli government pushed for the capture of the head waters of the Jordan 
River in the Golan Heights.  Among them was general Yigal Allon, who believed that seizing the 
Golan Heights would facilitate the unification of the Druze in Israel with those in the Jabal al-
Druze and thus empower the Druze-Israel alliance while undermining the Arabs strength.175  By 
the late 1960’s the Israeli-Druze leadership had sided politically with some of the hawkish 
establishment in the Israeli government.  These leaders supported Allon’s plan like the Druze 
Knesset member Sheikh Jabīr Mu‘adī who claimed the Druze in the Golan were mistreated by 
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Arab Muslims and welcomed the Jews.176  Under pressures from politicians and settlers alike 
Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan reluctantly ordered the final assault that would solidify 
Israel’s hold on the Golan Heights following the conflict.177 
 During the military campaign in the Golan the IDF focused their attacks on Muslim 
villages and towns near al-Qunīṭra.  By the end of the six day conflict approximately ninety 
percent of the 130,000 Syrian inhabitants of the Golan Heights had either fled or been 
expelled.178  The roughly 7,000 inhabitants that remained in the Golan lived in six villages that 
had been spared of the violence that ravaged the region.  Of the six villages that remained intact 
following the conflict Majdal Shams, Mas‘ada, Buq‘atā, ‘Eīn Qinya were inhabited by Druze, 
Ghajar179 was inhabited by ‘Alawis, and finally Sukhatah whose population was also Druze but 
was later evacuated and destroyed in order to build a military base in its place.180  In the months 
after the capture of the Golan Heights the Druze figured prominently in discussions about the 
future of the newly acquired territory.181 
 In August, Yigal Allon put forward a plan to use Druze from the Golan Heights to foment 
a rebellion in the Jabal al-Druze with the aim of creating an independent Druze state “that would 
maintain an economic, military, and diplomatic alliance with Israel.”182  Allon’s plan was based 
on two assumptions: 1) the Druze wanted an independent autonomous state, 2) the Syrian-Druze 
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wished to politically ally themselves with Israel against the neighboring Arab states.  Defense 
Minister Moshe Dayan categorically rejected Allon’s183 plan hinting that peace with Syria could 
possibly be gained through negotiations on the issue of returning portions of the Golan 
Heights.184  Many Israelis who like Allon, expected to be greeted warmly by “liberated” Syrian-
Druze were met with indifference from the community.  Contrary to some Israeli narratives, 
which mistake the lack of overt resistance to the Israeli occupation of the Golan for a Syrian-
Druze desire to adopt a position similar to their coreligionists in Israel, the Golan-community 
was generally not pleased with their current predicament.185  Syrian-Druze dissent, while 
passive, began soon after the occupation began and characterized the relations of the community 
with Israel in the 1970’s. 
 After the 1967 war the Israeli authorities put the Golan Heights under the supervision of 
the IDF and in the early years of the occupation all Syrian institutions were either eliminated or 
replaced by Israeli ones.  The military administrators of the Golan Heights quickly transformed 
the education system into a tool of the state outlawing the Syrian curriculum and replacing it 
with the curriculum taught in Israeli-Arab schools.186  They also fired the previous teachers at 
these schools and replaced them with soldiers and sometimes even other high school students in 
an attempt to stifle any pro-Syrian sentiment.187  In response to these measures many of the older 
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students refused to attend the Israeli run schools and never resumed their education following the 
occupation.188  The uncooperative behavior of the Druze in the Golan clashed with that of the 
leadership of the Druze in Israel and prompted Arab nationalists elements to seek their support. 
 In the early months of 1968 reports were already beginning to appear of Arab nationalist 
activities in the Golan Heights.  The Palestinian organization Fatah began distributing pamphlets 
denouncing “Israel’s propaganda” campaign and accusing Israel of violent offenses against the 
Druze.189  While Jewish settlers began making their claims on the Golan Heights and military 
rule stripped the Syrian-Druze of the Golan of their claims to the land Arab nationalist 
sympathies were on the rise among the Druze in both Israel and the Golan.  By 1969 Druze 
support for RAKAH, the communist party in Israel which advocated a number of Arab 
nationalist ideas, had grown to over ten percent of the Druze voting population.190  The following 
year, the death of Egyptian president and prominent Arab nationalist, Gamāl ‘abd al-Nāṣir, 
prompted widespread demonstrations against Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights by the 
Druze community there.  Many Druze high school students figured prominently in the 
demonstrations leading the military government to question the curriculum being used in the 
schools there.  Following the demonstrations the military administrators of the Golan responded 
by arresting a host of Druze and firing teachers in the local schools.191  As Israel’s occupation of 
the Golan Heights persisted the Druze’s resistance began to take more overt forms. 
The loyalty of the Golan-Druze to Syria and the expression of their Arab identity went 
beyond simple demonstrations.  While the Druze in the Golan accepted employment building 
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Israeli settlements and other Israeli enterprises192 many of them maintained connections with the 
Syrian government.  In the early seventies the Golan Druze leader Kamal Kanj, who had been 
targeted by Israel as a potential ally, was convicted of spying on behalf of Syria.193  Soon after 
his conviction Shin Bet, the intelligence wing of the IDF, arrested a large number of Druze for 
their involvement in an underground spy ring associated with the Communist party that was 
passing information to Syrian officials.194  Fifteen of these spies were teachers and students again 
signaling the failure of the educational system to create a pro-Israeli identity among the Druze 
community.195  Soon there after Shin Bet uncovered another underground Druze spy network 
connected with Syria led by Sheikh Abu Jamal in the Golan Heights.196  Despite these events the 
Israeli government still valued an alliance with the Druze and continued their campaign to co-opt 
the community.  
Israeli and Syrian efforts to maintain Druze loyalty spilled over into the 1973 war.  At the 
outset of the war Israel began to broadcast news decrying Syria’s treatment of the Druze 
community charging Syria with the execution of a Druze soldier for negligent duty.  Syria denied 
the charges, claiming the soldier had died in battle with the Israelis.  The regime went further 
inviting a local Druze leader to speak on the radio and criminalizing the sharing of ‘Israeli 
rumors’.197  Caught in the crossfire between the two warring powers the Druze community of the 
Golan rejected the use of force to return their villages to Syria and instead opted for quietist 
stance during the conflict.198  However, Israel’s ability to demonstrate their military superiority 
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their loyalties.  In the years after 1973 their pro-Syrian spy rings continued to operate among the 
inhabitants of the Golan pushing Israel to address these issues in a different manner.199 
Inculcating Druze Identity  
Following 1973, the pro-Israel factions of the Druze community and their allies in the 
government mounted a campaign to reform Druze education, which had continued to be lumped 
in with Arab education.  Although increasing the number of Druze teachers in schools with a 
large Druze population had been undertaken in the 1969 there had been very little effort to 
formalize an Israeli-Druze curriculum.200  In 1974 a number of Druze intellectuals protested the 
use of the shrine of  Nabi Shu’ayb for political purposes and publicly denounced Yitzak Rabin’s 
presence at the shrine during a Druze celebration of Nabi Shu‘ayb. The public rejection of the 
Israeli narrative of Druze history by segments of the Druze community was cause for alarm in 
both Druze and Israeli circles.  This event created a sense of urgency among the pro-Israeli 
Druze and their calls for education reform intensified.  Proponents of an Israeli-Druze school 
system blamed Arab influences in Druze education for the lack of a clear national identity.  
Israeli Professor Gabriel Ben-Dor was among those pushing for the creation of a new Israeli-
Druze curriculum.  He saw the lack of such curriculum as a key factor “relating to identity, 
citizenship, religion, and language.”201  Ben-Dor headed a committee to investigate and 
recommend how the Druze could be better integrated into the state to the Knesset.  His 
committee reported that the Arab education system does “little to educate and inculcate the 
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Druze youth with Israeli-Druze consciousness.  This has done damage to the state and its 
image.”202  He later recommended,  
[a] curriculum with special Druze features should be introduced soon into the Druze schools.  
With such a curriculum in place, it may be expected that part of the identity problem and, 
probably also, part of the feeling of frustration that stems from a the lack of clarity in issues 
relating to identity will be solved.  Thus the committee recommends to introduce this 
curriculum as soon as possible.203 
 
 By 1975 the Knesset had approved the creation of an Israeli-Druze curriculum with a 
special emphasis on “preparing Druze youth for military service in the IDF, strengthen the 
teaching of civics, Israeli consciousness and strengthen their Druze consciousness in the Druze 
and Hebrew schools.”204  Many aspects of the new Druze curriculum promoted the history and 
traditions that had been invented and imagined in the early years of Druze-Jewish relationship.  
Using selected elements of Druze folklore, traditions, history, festivals, etc. the new curriculum 
attempted to clarify Druze identity in terms that benefited the Jewish state.205  Confident of their 
ability to reshape Druze identity the Israeli authorities emphasized the importance of a Druze 
shrine in the Golan Heights with the hopes of gaining the support of the community there.206  As 
word of the development of the special Druze curriculum spread, an opposition formed.   
The pro-Arab elements of the Israeli-Druze community combined forces with the ‘uqqal, 
who feared the revelation of sacred Druze teachings to outsiders, to voice their opposition to the 
teaching of Druze heritage in schools.207  The pro-Arab Druze helped perpetuate such fears 
knowing that the ‘uqqal’s resistance to the new curriculum would impede its implementation and 	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weaken the pro-Israel community’s political power.  In the face of mounting opposition the pro-
Israel elements of the Druze community and their supporters in the government continued to 
push for the development and establishment of the new curriculum.  Convinced that the Druze 
were in the midst of an identity crisis due in part to their education alongside Arabs the 
government ignored the concerns of the ‘uqqal and created the Druze and Circassian Education 
and Culture Department in 1978.208  The education of the Druze was segregated from the Arab 
population with hopes of fostering a pro-Israeli consciousness and integrating the minority into 
Israeli society.  The goals of the formation of the Druze education systems are clear and 
reinforce the notion of the Druze as unique; this is demonstrated in the words of the 
superintendent of Druze education. 
Our aim is to educate towards deepening the roots of Druze belonging and love of the Other 
based on the principle of ‘protecting brethren’. We strive to educate our pupils to be proud of 
their belonging to the Druze ethnic group and to the State of Israel, such that they will be able 
to declare their belonging overtly in a strong voice and take pride in their belonging … We 
also teach Druze uniqueness, Druze history and heritage. If we deserve rights identical to 
those of the Jewish sector then it is our right to be responsible for the system whose aim it is 
to cultivate the Druze sector and to emphasize Druze uniqueness. I do not expect another 
sector to stand up for our rights and cultivate our history and heritage. We want to shape 
individuals who can contend with the post modern age, provided they do not forget their roots 
and values … we aim to build a healthy, moral, achievement oriented and educated Druze 
society. This is my personal vision as well, and I guide the school principals as much as I can 
in this direction, so that pupils maintain Druze identity and deal with modern society, while 
maintaining their roots and values.209 
 
 The history of Druze military service and their continued military service in the IDF is at 
the center of the curriculum’s aims to inculcate both ideas of citizenship and love of Israel.  The 
special Shelach unit is taught by IDF soldiers and is meant to prepare Druze students for service 
in the military.210  This curriculum glorifies the military legacy of the Druze and their 
connections with Israel.  One instructor of the Shelach unit described his purpose as to 	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“strengthen pupils Israeli identity and Druze pride.”211  The Druze curriculum connected what it 
means to be a Druze to service in the IDF by focusing on the recent history of the Israeli-Druze 
and glossing over historical Druze figures like Sulṭān al-Aṭrash who were defined by their 
rebellion against the state.  The new Druze curriculum was built on a fabricated narrative of 
history intended to reinforce an Israeli-Druze identity. 
 Another keystone of this curriculum is that loyalty to the state in which one lives has 
historically been a Druze value.212  This invented tenet of the Druze faith ignores a history of 
Druze autonomy and rebellion against forces that attempted to breech this autonomy.  The Druze 
rebellions against the Turks, French, and later Syrians are not mentioned.  Instead the curriculum 
defines being Druze as being a good, loyal citizen to the state without challenging the state’s 
narrative.  This sentiment is reflected in the words of a Druze student when questioned about his 
identity.  “I was born a Druze, I was educated as a Druze, and I’m loyal to my country because I 
am a Druze.”213  This invented heritage serves Israel and its narrative while also reinforcing the 
Druze with a sense of belonging and identity.  Issues of identity are glossed over or swept under 
the rug.  The following quote from an official from the Druze Education Department brushes off 
the concerns of some that the Druze curriculum does not address the complexity of Israeli-Druze 
identity and instead asserts that the real identity crisis exists among the Arab population. 
All individuals in the Druze sector, irrespective of age or residential area, define themselves 
as Israeli Druze that must fulfill all their duties to the State in order to receive their rights. 
Israeli identity is an integral part of Druze personal identity. This identity essentially means 
contributing to the State and being an integral part of it, cultivating and caring for the State in 
the full sense of the word. These activities reinforce Druze identity and Israeli identity. If I do 
not believe in the State and do not want to recognize the State, then there is no room for 
identity. I as supervisor want to address issues related to our mother tongue, Arabic, and also 
to the roots of our culture, which is an Arab culture. After all language and culture are 
important elements shaping identity. The Druze individual can identify in three ways: I am a 
Druze – I was born to a Druze family and when I die I will be reincarnated as a Druze; I am 	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an Israeli – I live in the State of Israel, I am an integral part of it, this is my country; I am an 
Arab – because of my language and culture. Most young people, adults and the elderly define 
themselves as Israeli Druze and have complete freedom to choose their identify. There is no 
conflict here. There is a clear identity that is a source of pride. For us, the Druze, our situation 
is relatively simple compared to the other Israeli population sectors. The Jews have identity 
dilemmas, and the Christians also cannot decide to whom to belong and how to identify 
themselves. For example, a prominent religious leader from the Christian sector expressed 
concern about radical Islam and fear of identifying himself as an Arab so as not to place 
Christians and radical Islam in the same category.214 
 
 Contradictions and concerns over an Israeli-Druze identity arose among students despite 
the curriculum and its proponents’ insistence that there was no contradiction.  Institutional and 
personal discrimination undermined the narrative of the Druze as partners in the Jewish state.  
Funding for education in Druze villages consistently lagged behind funding for education in 
Jewish settlements.  Additionally, there is a widespread belief among the Druze that they are 
discriminated against by other Israelis, who often mistake them for Arab Christians or Arab 
Muslims.215  An instructor of the Shelach curriculum in one Druze school discussed the issue of 
Druze identity and institutional discrimination. 
Reality is scary. We educate the pupils to love their country, contribute to the country, but the 
State does not fully compensate those that invest efforts on its behalf. Eventually, this may 
lead to hatred towards the State and violence in society. I am very concerned about the 
situation. Although the numbers are very small, this sentiment may expand if policy towards 
the Druze ethnic group does not change. Unfortunately, there is a conflict among the youth 
about the definition of their identity. A few of the pupils I encounter experience a conflict and 
ask why they should serve in the army, after all look at the other minorities – they do not 
serve and do nothing for the country, but nevertheless are granted all the rights – while I serve 
in the army for three years the Moslems and Christians complete their undergraduate studies 
and begin working. I may be unemployed after my military service. What am I supposed to 
say to these pupils about such a conflict? I think that the State must understand the situation 
and address it. Otherwise, the situation will deteriorate. Once again, I am saying that these are 
the arguments of only a small share of the pupils, but nonetheless they exist and may expand 
if the situation does not change.216 
 
Despite an emerging identity crisis in the Israeli-Druze community the vast majority of 
them continued to assert their Israeli-Druze identity and serve loyally in the military and other 
state institutions.  The Israeli-Druze community’s acceptance of the state narrative of their 	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history meant that this narrative was reinforced both in public, through schools and military 
service and in the home.  Despite the persistence of varying degrees of discrimination against the 
Israeli-Druze, they rarely openly resist state policies.  This is not to say that there have not been 
bouts of protest against the state, but they are rare and generally tame.  Due to a number of 
differences in relations with the Golan-Druze, among them military service, the implementation 
and response to the new Druze curriculum was much different there.   
The goals of this new curriculum conflicted with the views of the Golan-Druze and as it 
was being formed they sought to maintain ties with Syria.  Both the Syrian and Golan Druze 
petitioned the Israeli authorities with the assistance of the International Red Cross to allow Druze 
from the Golan to undertake their university education in Syria.  Due to the poor quality of 
secondary education under the military administration and the lack of contact with Jews in the 
Golan many Druze students in the Golan were not literate in Hebrew or able to qualify for study 
in Israeli universities.217  Conversely, Syria still considered the Druze in the Golan Heights 
citizens and offered them a free university education in Syria.  Israel’s occupation of the Golan 
Heights remained the only obstacle to a university education for many of the Druze there.  
Hoping to improve their relations with the Golan-Druze the Israeli government agreed to allow 
fifteen residents of the Golan to study in Syria provided that the military administration be 
allowed to choose them.218  Even as the Israeli government was allowing a small number of 
Druze to study in Damascus each year authorities demanded strict control over all aspects of 
Druze education in the Golan in order to limit dissent. 
 Implementing the Israeli-Druze curriculum in the Golan Heights meant removing 
education from the jurisdiction of the military in order to put it in the care of the newly formed 	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Druze and Circassian Education department.  The majority of the teachers in Golan-Druze 
schools are recruited locally and therefore identify themselves as Syrian rather than Israeli.219  In 
the Golan the ministry of education closely monitors Druze teachers, many of whom disagree 
with how Druze tradition, identity, and culture are framed and disseminated in the Druze 
curriculum, in an effort to ensure that these teachers do not deviate from the designed curriculum 
or engage in any pro-Syrian activities.220  All Druze teachers are carefully screened before being 
hired and because the majority of those in the Golan Heights are not Israeli citizens they are 
given year long contracts, which were up for renewal shortly before the beginning of each school 
year.221  When the Israeli authorities choose not to renew a teacher’s contract they are not 
required to give cause for their decision and the teacher is not able to appeal it.222  Israel’s efforts 
to maintain control over the classroom has muted attempts to create an open dialogue on the 
Golan-Druze and their role in the Jewish state. 
 Any teachers who wish to engage their classes in a dialogue on the political situation in 
the Golan or express their political opinions in the classroom risk losing their jobs.  On average 
three teachers are dismissed annually by the Israeli authorities on the eve of the school year.223  
Under the purview of the Israeli government the only political discussions that are acceptable in 
the classroom are those that endorse Israel’s narrative and are devoid of criticisms of the state.  
Since this narrative conflicts directly with the Syrian self-identification of most of the teachers in 
the Golan Heights most remain silent on matters pertaining to politics.  The passive approach of 
Druze teachers in the Golan Heights undermines the Israeli efforts by taking politics out of the 
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classroom.224  One Druze student from the Golan Heights expressed the dearth of politics in the 
classroom in these terms,  
In my school we can discuss any subject as much as we wish to, as long as it is not related to 
politics. The teacher is not allowed to speak in class about political issues. If we wish to argue 
with a friend about political issues, we do it out of school. Inside school there is no political 
awareness. We get political awareness (and knowledge) only at home and in the street, but 
never ever from school. The teachers are afraid that the principal will reprimand them, and 
the principal in turn is afraid of the government.225 
 
  The pro-Syrian forces in the Golan Heights have capitalized on the absence of politics in 
the classroom by pointing to the political bias that exists in the school curriculum.  The 
effectiveness of the Israeli-Druze curriculum in the Golan Heights is severely limited by the 
Druze community’s promotion of their Syrian identity.  In the Golan Heights there are 
significant differences in how Druze history and identity are framed in the classroom and in the 
streets and homes.  Every time a political discussion arises on the streets or in the home the 
Israeli narrative is undermined.226  If a Druze teacher seeks to confront these challenges to the 
Israeli narrative by the Syrian forces in the community his or her efforts are undermined by the 
belief that the teacher’s motivations lie in keeping their job.  Israel’s hegemonic control of the 
education in the Golan Heights has undermined the legitimacy of large portions of the 
curriculum.  When asked about the Druze heritage unit in Druze schools in the Golan Heights, 
one high school teacher remarked that the students show very little interest in the subject.227  
While the Golan-Druze overwhelmingly attend the Israeli run schools their attendance is viewed 
as a means of educating the community and not an endorsement of Israel’s occupation of the 
Golan Heights. 
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 In the 1980’s university education became an arena of competition for Druze support in 
the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria.  The failure of the new Druze education program to 
win the loyalty of the Golan led the Israeli authorities to question permitting Golan-Druze to 
attend university in Syria.  In response to protests against Israel’s decision to annex the Golan 
Heights and impose citizenship on the Golan-Druze, Israel suspended the right of Druze to study 
in Syria (this issue will be covered in greater detail in chapter four).228  In 1983 the Syrian 
authorities responded to Israel’s policy by organizing and paying for scholarships for the Golan-
Druze to study in the USSR.  Under this new program the most politically active Druze in the 
Golan Heights chose who would be awarded with these new scholarships.  Those empowered by 
the Syrian sponsored scholarship program often awarded scholarships to students who were 
politically active in their opposition to the occupation of the Golan Heights.229  Rewarding 
political activism and rejection of Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights intensified resistance 
to Israeli efforts to co-opt the community.   
 These scholarships empowered some Golan-Druze economically.  The majority of the 
Golan-Druze who take advantage of these scholarships received degrees in prestigious fields 
such as medicine, law, and dentistry.230  While there are few jobs available for people with these 
degrees in the Golan Heights many are able to obtain work in cities like Haifa and Tel Aviv that 
enables them to assist their families financially.231  Israel is blamed for the lack of professional 
jobs available in the Golan Heights and conversely due in part to their scholarship programs 
Syria is perceived as a great benefactor.232  Losing the battle for the Golan-Druze, Israeli 
authorities lifted the ban on Druze study in Syria overseen by the International Red Cross in 	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1989.233  This decision enabled the Israeli authorities to select which students would be awarded 
scholarships for study in Syria and challenge pro-Syrian influences in the community. 
 The creation of the Druze Education Department was a success despite its struggles in the 
Golan Heights.  By the mid-1980’s criticisms of the new Druze curriculum and the political 
activities of the intellectuals had generally subsided.  The reforms in Druze education were a 
boon to the Israeli-Druze community economically.  They increased the demand for Druze 
teachers and administrators and the number of Druze working in these positions grew 
exponentially in the years after 1978.234  The new schools established in Druze communities 
throughout northern Israel additionally created a large number of support staff jobs, some of 
which are designed for former Israeli-Druze soldiers.  The increase in teaching positions catered 
to the Israeli-Druze intellectuals who in the 1960’s and 1970’s had few avenues to employment 
in Israel.  These teachers while not as politically neutered as their counterparts in the Golan 
Heights risk losing their jobs if their politics become involved in the classroom.  The economic 
growth in the community also dampened some of the criticisms of the state. 
 The educational reforms and the creation of the Druze Education Department served 
different purposes for Golan-Druze and the Israeli-Druze.  The reform of Israeli-Druze 
curriculum and the formation of the Israeli-Druze school system created new ways of shaping 
Druze identity and a careers in relation to the state.  In Israel these reforms expanded on the 
influences of service in the IDF and offered more economic support to the Druze community 
through the state.  In response the growing chorus critical of Israel’s “Druze policy” generally 
subsided and ideas of citizenship and the Druze role in the state were reinforced.  In the Golan 
Heights however, these ideas were contested by Syria through their own education programs that 	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reached out to the Druze in the disputed territory.  In response the Golan-Druze continued to 
reject Israeli citizenship and assert their Syrian nationality.  While the Golan-Druze and Israeli-
Druze socialize the Golan communities continues to try and strengthen relations with Syrian-
Druze community instead of those in Israel.  A number of issues will be discussed in the next 
chapter including the socialization between the two communities and the right of religious 
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Identity Crises and Resistance 
In the continuing struggle to win the sympathies of the Druze communities, both Israel 
and Syria valued the potential impact of disseminating national identities through education.  
They both realized the limitations of education alone in regard to their goals.  As the efforts of 
both Israel and Syria influenced members of the Druze community, oppositional identities 
formed in the Druze community often based on geographical location and economic situation.  
Additionally it has become evident that efforts to un-imagine or reinvent the identity of the 
Golan-Druze is a futile endeavor.  This chapter will explore how the Syrian facet of Golan-Druze 
identification has been so resilient and why that has complicated relations with the Israeli-Druze 
community.  Furthermore this chapter will also discuss how the ongoing evolution of relations 
between the state and the Israeli-Druze community have been impacted by Israel’s failure to 
address the demands of the community and the continued Arab nationalist discourse. 
The 1982 Golan Strike 
After fourteen years of occupying the Golan Heights, the Israeli authorities embarked on 
their next phase of co-opting the Golan-Druze.  The initial policy instituted in 1980 involved the 
offer of citizenship and with it favored treatment to any Golan-Druze who requested it.  The 
Israeli authorities hoped this policy would usher in a host of Golan-Druze accepting Israeli 
citizenship and cut into the numbers of Druze calling for a return of the Golan Heights to Syria.  
This would in turn strengthen Israel’s justification for the formal annexation of the territory 
while weakening Syria’s claims to it.235  With the support of Golan-Druze few international 
powers would condemn Israel’s annexation plan.  However, Israel’s citizenship policies 
motivated the Golan-Druze to mobilize against annexation and imposed citizenship and in the 	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community contributed to the organization of widespread civil disobedience against the state and 
annexation.   
 Very few Golan-Druze sought out and applied for Israeli citizenship following Israel’s 
offer to the community.  In response to the offer of citizenship the Golan-Druze organized a 
community meeting in Majdal Shams in which it was decided that Israeli citizenship should be 
rejected by all in the Golan Heights.236  Despite the potential harassment and risk of losing their 
jobs the vast majority of the Golan-Druze spurned the offers of Israeli citizenship.  Viewing the 
acceptance of Israeli citizenship as a rejection of their Syrian and Arab heritage the community 
shunned those who went against the community’s position on the matter.  According to Jonathan 
Kuttab, a Palestinian lawyer who represented many Golan-Druze in their grievances against the 
state, “They decided that anyone who accepts Israeli identity cards is really cutting themselves 
off from the community 'They are no longer one of us, no longer a Druze”237  
The solidarity of the Golan-Druze alienated those who had accepted new identity papers.  
Few within the community would speak with the former community members.  The newest 
Israeli-Druze were not welcome at community events, weddings, funerals, or other religious 
gatherings.  The community also refused to offer prayers on behalf of the Israeli-Druze’s 
deceased.  The immense social pressure to reject citizenship pushed most of those who had done 
so to publicly recant their mistake and plead to be admitted back into the community.238  Often 
this meant going door to door and apologizing to their neighbors or contributing money to the 
families of those who had been victimized most by Israel’s occupation of the Golan-Heights.239 
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Israel’s plan of a de facto annexation of the Golan Heights utterly failed due to the organization 
and solidarity of the Golan-Druze community. 
Unable to garner the support of the Golan-Druze, Israeli authorities ignored international 
pressures and quickly moved to annex the disputed territory near the end of 1981.  As part of this 
annexation plan the roughly twelve thousand Druze living in the Golan Heights would be 
expected to accept Israeli identity cards.240  Some Israeli leaders downplayed the Golan-Druze 
reticence to accept Israeli identity cards, claiming that they feared the reprisals against their 
relatives in Syria.241  This argument fails to explain the Pro-Syrian activities such as the flying of 
Syrian flags, involvement in espionage rings, and large protests that erupted in the early months 
of 1982.  Concerns over the Druze reaction to the decision however were brushed aside and the 
Knesset opted to annex the Golan Heights.  When the decision to annex the Golan Heights was 
pushed through the Knesset by Menachem Begin many aspects of the plan remained vague; 
including whether or not the Golan-Druze would be compelled to accept Israeli citizenship.242  
This move prompted concern among the Golan-Druze community who proudly adhered to their 
Syrian identity.   
 Instead of unilaterally demanding that the Golan-Druze accept Israeli citizenship, the 
authorities impeded the Golan-Druze who refused citizenship from doing anything remotely 
connected with the state unless they accepted citizenship.  Those who went to obtain a driving 
license or a building permit were denied.  Israel also refused to recognize the births of children to 
Druze without Israeli citizenship.  In the early years of the occupation many Golan-Druze gained 
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employment working in nearby Israeli settlements or teaching in the Israeli-Druze schools.  
These teachers and day laborers connected with the state or the settlements were fired for 
refusing to accept citizenship.243  In February 1982 the leaders of the Golan-Druze community 
sent a telegram to Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin informing him of the communities 
intent to resist annexation and their commitment to Syria.244  The Israeli responded by arresting 
the four Golan-Druze Sheikhs Kamāl al-Kanj, Sulīmān Kanj, Maḥmūd Ḥasan al-Ṣafadī, and 
Kanj Kanj on charges of inciting rebellion.245  Following Israel’s arrest of the Druze Sheikhs the 
community held a meeting to organize a resistance to the heavy handed policy of the Israel and 
formally reject Israel’s annexation plan.246  The plan adopted by the Golan-Druze called for mass 
civil disobedience including the refusal to pay taxes, rejection of Israeli services, and any form of 
Israeli civil law if the annexation plan was not rescinded. Again these threats were passed over 
by government officials claiming that the Druze would not follow through on their threats and 
the debacle was the result of Syrian propaganda.247  The Israeli government underestimated the 
resolve of the Golan-Druze and their commitment to Syria. 
 By mid-February the Golan-Druze were committed to a massive strike shutting down 
schools and businesses through out the Golan Heights in both Druze villages and Israeli 
settlements.248  Many Golan-Druze were determined and ready for a protracted struggle with the 
Israelis.  In an interview with the Washington Post one Golan-Druze boasted, “Maybe the 
workers can stay at home without work for one year.”249  Most Druze households in the Golan 	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Heights began stock piling food and supplies in preparation for a long continued strike.  Druze 
leaders began resigning from village councils and all but thirty of the three thousand Golan-
Druze who worked in the settlements and state affiliated jobs refused to appear at work.250  The 
rhetoric emerging from both the leaders of the strike and their followers was infused with Arab 
nationalism and the importance of the Druze community to the Arab community.  Salmān 
Fahadin, one of the leaders of the strike, denounced Israel’s intention of annexing the Golan 
Heights comparing it to a declaration of war while emphasizing their ties with the Arab 
nationalist cause.  “Our strike proves that national unity is very strong among the Druze … Our 
Patience is limited.  The Israeli government’s disrespect for us is part their disrespect for all 
Arabs of this region, including the Syrians.”251  Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights aroused 
intense pro-Syrian and pro-Arab sentiments among the Golan-Druze. 
 In the early days of the strike nationalist slogans and speeches were repeated often, 
decrying the acts of the Jewish occupation and its futility.  Whether produced by young secular 
Druze or older more religious sheikhs their words nearly always emphasized unity with the Arab 
cause.  One village elder from Buq‘aātā declared, “We are united and the clarity with which this 
unity has appeared is based on our common Arab identity, which the Israelis seek to 
obliterate.”252  Another common theme among the Druze regarding the annexation was that 
Israel was hoping to strip them of their Arab identity.  According to one young Druze villager the 
occupation was temporary but, “Now by annexing the Golan Heights the Israelis are forcing us 
to fight for our Arab identity and our Syrian Identity.” Adding, “who are they to decide our 
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identity? Who are they to decide whether we shall be Arab or Israeli?”253  An important aspect of 
Druze identity within the framework of Arab nationalism was their history of rebellion.  One 
secular villager declared, “We [Druze] are the integral Arabs, we do not accept any rule but Arab 
rule.  We rebelled against Turkish rule.  We resisted French colonialism.  Those who 
collaborated with Israel are religiously and socially shunned by us and they will learn the 
mistake of their ways.254 
 The IDF military administration responded to the civil unrest in the Golan-Druze villages 
by cutting phone lines, restricting media personal from the region, and arresting other Druze who 
were thought to be leaders of the strike.255  On 25 February 1982 the IDF sealed off villages 
entrances and drove through the streets blaring a message via loudspeakers that the inhabitants 
were not allowed to leave.  When these measures failed to compel the Druze to cooperate IDF 
soldiers went door to door confiscating old identity papers replacing them with the new Israeli 
identity cards.256  These acts only united the determined Golan-Druze in their defiance of the 
Israeli authorities.   
 The strike’s early success was in part due to the cooperative attitude of the villagers.  
Families shared food with those who did not have enough to hold out.  The Golan-Druze villages 
embarked on village improvement projects in which each household donated labor and-or money 
to the project.  One village used the early days of the strike to a complete sewer renovation 
project that had been neglected by the state the previous year.257  In another village, members of 
the community collective worked in the orchards assuming the strike would continue into the fall 
and the harvest would be shared by all.  Each village set up their own schools and construction 	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projects.  They were also politically active throughout the strike demonstrating in front of Israeli 
soldiers.  The villagers often sought out IDF soldiers and told them their plight and their desire 
for the dispute to remain peaceful.258  The level of cooperation and the length of the strike 
demonstrated the Golan-Druze’s commitment to maintain their Syrian identity and reject Israel’s 
plans.  This directly contradicted Israel’s narrative that the whole thing was a charade and would 
end quickly due to the lack of Druze commitment. 
 By the end of March the Israelis realized that the strike was not going to disappear on its 
own accord and decided to change tactics.  On 1 April 1982 between 13,000 and 15,000 IDF 
troops entered the Golan Heights surrounding the four Druze villages there.  Electricity and 
water lines to the villages were cut and village schools were occupied.  The IDF units even began 
demolishing a small number of houses and other buildings in the villages.259  The IDF began a 
full scale siege in the Druze villages despite the non-violent nature of the strike.  The Golan-
Druze still refused to give in littering the village streets with their new IDF issued identity cards 
and organizing new demonstrations against the occupation daily.  Despite intense pressure from 
the Israeli government, the Golan-Druze community stood firm in their resolve. 
 The IDF continued its campaign for two and a half more months arresting civilians by the 
hundreds and repressing popular demonstrations in the villages before regional politics refocused 
Israel’s attention.  A few prominent members of the Israeli-Druze community tried to mediate 
the conflict but failed to convince either the Israeli government or the Golan-Druze to back 
down.260  Repeated guerilla raids from southern Lebanon shifted Israel’s attention from the 
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Golan Heights to Lebanon and in June 1982 the IDF invaded southern Lebanon.  Convinced that 
their strike would not succeed without media attention the leadership of Golan-Druze reached a 
tacit agreement with the Israeli authorities and suspended their strike.261  Under this agreement 
the Golan-Druze would accept new Israeli issued identity cards providing that the cards 
recognized their Syrian nationality.  The agreement also stipulated that the government would 
not confiscate Druze land or interfere with Golan water sources.262  Furthermore Israel would 
respect their Syrian-Arab identity by listing it on their new identity cards.  Finally there would be 
open crossings into Syria and Golan-Druze would be permitted to export their produce to Syrian 
markets.263  Despite no formal agreement the Golan-Druze officially suspended their strike in 
late June. 
Discontent and Protest in the Israeli-Druze Community 
 While the strike had ended a large number of Golan-Druze still refused to accept new 
identity cards because they did not specify national identity; instead their nationality was listed 
as undefined.264  Periodically, the IDF would arrest handfuls of Golan-Druze for refusing to carry 
the Israeli identity cards.  Simultaneously, discontent among the Israeli-Druze communities was 
on the rise.  This discontent centered around Israeli land policies that had gradually been 
stripping the Druze and other Arabs of their lands since the inception of the state.265  As 
mentioned in chapter two the Israeli-Druze had traditionally relied on agriculture to make a 
living.  The early losses in agricultural jobs were offset by new employment opportunities in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Israeli-­‐Druze	  in	  the	  strike.	  	  It	  was	  confirmed	  however	  that	  the	  Israeli-­‐Druze	  help	  police	  the	  Golan	  Heights	  typically	  in	  mixed	  Jewish-­‐Druze	  units.	  261	  It	  is	  unclear	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  political	  power	  of	  the	  Lebanese-­‐Druze	  influenced	  Israel’s	  decision	  to	  grant	  these	  terms	  to	  the	  Golan-­‐Druze.	  	  The	  Lebanese-­‐Druze	  had	  at	  times	  been	  powerful	  allies	  of	  PLO	  forces	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  were	  skilled	  soldiers	  threatening	  Israel’s.	  	  The	  Druze’s	  reputation	  for	  communalism	  could	  have	  influenced	  Israel	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  those	  in	  the	  Golan	  in	  order	  to	  placate	  a	  potential	  enemy	  in	  Lebanon.	  262	  Moloney,	  Stewart,	  and	  Hamil-­‐Tuohy.	  33	  263	  Kennedy.	  56	  264	  Druze	  Shop	  Owner	  Ein	  Qinya,	  interview	  by	  author.	  (March	  27,	  2012)	  265	  Firro.	  The	  Druzes	  in	  the	  Jewish	  State.	  219	  
	   82	  
military, police force, and later in the new Israeli-Druze schools.  The Israeli-Druze expressed 
their opposition to Israel’s land expropriation policies but never had mobilized in a way that 
forced Israel to address their concerns.   
 Employment opportunities in the military and education were limited and could not 
accommodate the growing Israeli-Druze population, this created problems for new generations of 
Druze seeking employment.  Israel’s strict control of both who possessed the land and how the 
land would be used prohibited the industrial development in Israeli-Druze villages.  Other than 
the Qadamani brothers’ factory in the village of Yarka, industrialization was nearly absent from 
Druze villages.266  As explained to me by one Druze village official, the Druze, like other Israeli-
Arabs, are rarely granted building permits.  Not only does this limit building factories, produce 
storage, and food processing plants but also the construction of new homes and the expansion of 
Druze villages.267  This has left Israeli-Druze villages with few local employment opportunities 
that do not involve working for the state.  This forced many Israeli-Druze to seek employment in 
settlements many as far away as the Negev desert.  According to a field study by Yūsuf Ḥasan, a 
Druze researcher, by the late 1980’s more than sixty percent of the Israeli-Druze community 
were working outside of their own villages.268   
 Israeli-Druze protests focused around land and the freedom to access agricultural land 
and irrigation water.  The Israel government allocated only .056 percent of irrigation water to the 
Druze community despite the Druze community constituting nearly two percent of the total 
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population and the majority of them living in agrarian communities.269  At the same time Israeli 
settlements continued to be constructed on confiscated lands.  During the Lebanese Civil War 
interactions between Israeli and Lebanese-Druze led many IDF Druze soldiers to question their 
allegiance to Israel.270  In the 1980’s some Israeli-Druze began to aggressively oppose these 
discriminatory policies demanding access to their lands and resources.  The village of Beit Jan 
located in the Upper-Galilee is a great example of how some Israeli-Druze mobilized at this time.   
 In the 1950’s the Israeli government established a national park adjacent to the village 
and zoned a significant portion of Druze land as wilderness prohibiting cultivation or 
construction on them.271  In the 1980’s disagreements over the state’s control of Druze owned 
land came to a head as the village spear headed by their mayor undertook a campaign to wrest 
their lands from the national park’s control.  The movement initially operated through the state 
channels of authority; petitioning the Knesset and even organizing a meeting between the village 
mayor and then Prime Minister Shimon Peres.272  The meetings did not result in any concessions 
prompting the Arab nationalist and Palestinian movements to spring to the defense of the small 
Druze village through demonstrations, press release, and rallies denouncing Israel.273  In March 
1987, the Druze municipality decided that the village should strike provoking a violent campaign 
of repression by the IDF.   
 The Israeli-Druze repeatedly voiced that their claims to the land preceded the 
establishment of Israel and that the state had no right to interfere in their affairs.  A group of 
Israeli-Druze from Beit Jan built a make shift settlement in the heart of the national park adjacent 	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to Beit Jan asserting that the land was theirs.  In July the IDF approached the small encampment 
in an attempt to evacuate the area prompting an escalation of violence.  The Israeli-Druze 
attempted to fight off the IDF turning police vehicles upside down and setting them on fire.274  In 
response the IDF forces arrested over one hundred Druze.  The strike continued for two more 
months before the Israeli authorities stepped down and entered into serious negotiations on the 
matter.  The next year a land exchange program was imposed on the village who never assented 
to it.  The state justified the land grab asserting that the Druze were being given better land closer 
to their villages in exchange for large uncultivable tracts of land further from the village.275  
While the strikes had subsided the discontent of the Israeli-Druze still lingered. 
 The imagined shared history of the Jews and the Druze continued to be undermined by 
the discriminatory policies of the state.  The Israeli-Druze perceptions that they were partners 
with the Jews in building Israel were fading.  Throughout the 1990’s the Israeli-Druze continued 
to demand equality from the state.276   Speaking on the position of the Druze in Israeli society the 
prominent Israeli-Druze news editor, Rafīq Ḥalabī, castigated Israelis for their neglect of the 
Druze saying, “We are not in the minds of, or even in the back of the minds of Israelis …. Israeli 
society is dealing with its existence and that’s all, they don’t give a damn for anyone else.”277  
Israeli-Druze soldiers spoke out more frequently on the lack of employment opportunities after 
their military service.  By the 1990’s the security sector was responsible for the employment of 
nearly one-third of the Israeli-Druze and in disadvantaged villages like Beit Jan the number of 
those employed by the security sector rose to nearly two-thirds.278  One Israeli-Druze noted that 
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as soon as he hung up his rifle he was treated like an “Arab.”279  Another common complaint was 
that despite their reputation as quality soldiers and good citizens many qualified Druze were 
passed over for high military or government positions.280  The sentiment of the Israeli-Druze is 
captured in the words of Druze Knesset member Sheikh Ṣāliḥ Ṭarīf. 
The Druze have been fooled for too long. We cannot and will not put up any more with empty 
promises and hollow gestures in return to the blood of our sons. We will employ all means 
within our command to achieve what we rightly deserve: total equality with the Jews in all 
aspects of life in Israel. As proud Druze we will fight to the end.281 
 
 Israel’s response to the demands of the Israeli-Druze community has been to grant token 
concessions that do little to alleviate the economic plight of the community.  For example in 
1992 Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, noting that Jewish students received nearly twice as much 
funding as Druze students, instituted a five year plan to close the funding gap between Druze and 
Jewish schools.282  The gaps in funding were never realized.  Another example is the decision to 
allocate more irrigation water to Israeli-Druze villages in 1995, however the increase in irrigation 
water did not sufficiently meet the community’s needs.283  Occasionally the government 
appointed an Israeli-Druze to high positions either in the IDF or Israeli foreign service.284  These 
measures helped dampen the dissent coming from the Israeli-Druze community but failed to 
answer the community’s calls for equal treatment.  Despite these calls for equal treatment a 
strong pro-Israeli Druze leadership still perpetuated the founding narrative of the state.  Yūṣil 
Naṣir al-Dīn, chairman of the Zionist Druze Movement285, traveled to the US and Canada on 
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behalf of the World Zionist Organization asserting that the Druze are not Arab nor are they 
Muslim and that Israel is the protector of their religious independence.286  This view directly 
conflicted with that of those Druze who sympathized with the Arab nationalist and Palestinian 
cause. 
Looking to Syria in the Golan 
 The efforts of individuals like Naṣir al-Dīn helped widen the gulf existing between the 
Druze in the Golan Heights and those in Israel.  In the Golan Heights the majority of the Druze 
choose to strengthen their ties with the Druze community in Syria rather than build stronger ties 
with the Israeli-Druze, whom they could easily visit.287  Although Druze religious leaders from 
both communities continued to meet regularly, the level of social interaction between the two 
geographical communities remained cool despite three decades of separation from Syria.288  This 
is evidenced by the marriage rates between Israeli-Druze and Golan-Druze.  In the early 1990’s  
the International Committee of the Red Cross, who oversees the Qunīṭrā border crossing 
connecting the Golan Heights to Syria, brokered an agreement between Israel and Syria on 
behalf of the Druze community that permitted Druze women to migrate to either the Golan or 
Syria for the purpose of marriage.289  However, once they receive the permission and cross the 
border into Syria they are not allowed to return to visit their families or friends in the Golan 
Heights.290  This agreement enabled the Druze in both the Golan and Syria to cultivate new ties 
linking the severed communities.  This marriage process is an arduous ordeal filled with heaps of 	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bureaucratic paper work and red tape. 
This is the process that is somewhat accurately depicted in the 2004 film The Syrian 
Bride.  In the film the bride experiences countless delays prohibiting her from entering Syria to 
be married delaying her marriage for months.  This process can last years before the Syrian and 
Israeli governments agree to allow the marriage to happen.291  Before a Syrian bride is allowed 
into the Golan Heights or a Golani bride allowed into Syria, marriage arrangements must be 
made in order to obtain the proper paper work.  The Golan-Druze often negotiate these marriage 
contracts through family contacts in Syria or religious sheikhs visiting Syria for religious 
purposes.  These marriages help cement family ties and loyalties.   It is also common that these 
marriages result from Golan-Druze who began courting a Syrian during their studies in Syria.292  
While Golan-Druze students who meet and marry Syrian-Druze during their studies in Damascus 
have the option to remain in Syria, most feel obligated to return to the Golan to ensure that their 
land is not confiscated by Israelis.293  Both Golan-Druze and Syrian-Druze make meaningful 
sacrifices to ensure that the two communities are linked. 
Despite the burdensome process that takes place before immigration and the harsh 
restrictions on family visitations which essentially amounts to saying good bye to villages the 
Golan-Druze continue to chose to marry Syrians rather than their coreligionists in Israel.  When I 
asked one Golan-Druze why they do not choose to marry Israeli-Druze more often, he simply 
shrugged and told me that they don’t interact with them as often.294  This is strange considering 
the obstacles confronting those seeking to maintain family ties between the Golan and Syria.  	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Marriage between the Golan-Druze and the Israeli-Druze does occur but it is unclear how it 
compares to the trend of marrying Syrian-Druze.295  The Syrian-Druze and Golan-Druze often 
share more in common ideologically and politically.  Interaction between the communities is 
encouraged and before the rise of the internet communities members would meet at the border 
and shout greetings to one another across the demilitarized zone with the use of loudspeakers.  
Those from both communities who are financially able use Jordan, which holds diplomatic 
relations with both countries, as a place to meet and cultivate relations between them.  The 
Golan-Druze explain that they do this because they are Syrian and it is important to engage their 
homeland.296  The loyalty of the Golan-Druze to their Syrian homeland have been rewarded by 
the al-Asad regime. 
In 1999 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak entered into negotiations with Syrian 
President Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad over normalizing relations between the two states.  At the center of these 
negotiations was the issue of returning the Golan Heights to Syria.  Whether Barak entered into 
these negotiations in good faith or just stalling the peace process is unclear, but it did evoke fears 
from a small minority of Golan-Druze who feared being returned Syrian control.297  When the 
peace talks failed the Syrian government expanded their efforts to maintain the loyalty of the 
Golan-Druze.  In 2003, reports that the Syrian government had begun paying the pensions of  
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seventy-three Golan-Druze teachers surfaced in Israel.298  This Syrian policy directed at the 
Golan came in response to Israeli pressure on teachers to accept Israeli citizenship and with it 
tenure at the Israeli-Druze schools in the Golan Heights.  One teacher benefiting from the 
program complained that the Golan-Druze teachers received “nothing” from Israel and that Syria 
is, “giving them everything they deserve.”299  Programs like this continued to foster Syrian and 
Arab nationalism among the Golan-Druze despite being occupied by Israel considerably longer 
than they had been a part of the modern Syrian nation-state.   
The regime of Bashār al-Asad continued to seek ways to reinforce Syrian identity in the 
Golan Heights.  One of the demands of the Golan-Druze strike that paralyzed the region in 1982 
was the right to sell their produce to Syrian markets.300  Agriculture has remained at the center of 
the Golan-Druze economy and the community depended on the apple and cherry harvests to 
sustain their standard of living.  Depending on how plentiful the crop is, the cherry and apple 
harvests can employ as much as fifty percent of the Golan-Druze work force on a seasonal basis 
and the income from the harvest on a good year can be as much as seventy percent of the Golan-
Druze economy.301  However Druze famers in the Golan Heights faced increased competition 
from Jewish farmers who were able to use their market connections and water privileges to cut 
into the market.302  In 2005, al-Asad’s government agreed to open the border to apple shipments 
from Golan-Druze farmers.  
The Golan-Druze benefited not only from access to the Syrian market but also to Arab 
markets where trade restrictions prohibited the import of Israeli produce.  Many of the apples 	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trucked into Syria from the Golan were than in turn exported as Syrian produce to other markets.  
The price of apples is set by the Golan farmers and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
oversees the transfer of Golan apples from the Golan to Damascus via the border crossing at 
Qunīṭrā.303  In the first year of the program 4000 tons of apples were exported from the Golan 
Heights to Syrian markets and that number has continued to grow every year with the exception 
of 2008 when poor growing conditions contributed to a below average harvest.304  Today the 
number of apples being exported to Syria has tripled from 4000 tons in 2005 to 12,000 tons the 
last two years.305  The 12,000 tons exported to Syria accounts for approximately forty percent of 
the total apple crop in the Golan-Druze villages.306  The apple trade has created a wealth of 
goodwill toward the Syrian regime in the Golan Heights and reinforced the Syrian identity of the 
Druze there. 
The role the apple trade plays in reinforcing Syrian identity in the Golan should not be 
understated.  Basām Abū ‘Awaḍ, a Golan-Druze apple farmer, credits the apple trade for his 
strong Syrian identity saying, “Getting the fruit into the rest of Syria helps us [Golan-Druze] 
maintain close ties with our relatives on the other side and gives us back a sense of identity.”307  
Through this program President al-Asad has successfully cultivated goodwill toward the Syrian 
regime in the Golan Heights.  Sayyed Farhart, a Golan-Druze who works closely with the apple 
transfer, stressed the importance of the Syrian president to the Golan-Druze saying, “We thank 
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our President, Bashār al-Asad, who is providing support for the farmers.  The hope is that there 
will be a free market when peace comes.”308  Similar feelings were stressed by the Golan-Druze 
whom I interviewed.  All of them stressed their gratitude for the Syrian regime’s support of the 
apple industry in the Golan and all with the exception of one expressed their belief that Syria’s 
role in the apple industry is vital to the economy of the Golan Heights.  Conversely Israel is seen 
as the cause of economic woes in the Golan Heights. 
 The poor apple crop in 2008 was the result of drought.  The Golan Druze blamed Israel 
for the lack of irrigation claiming that they had failed to properly manage the water resources in 
the Golan Heights and this led to the inadequate water supply in 2008 and 2009.  The Golan-
Druze protested Israel’s water management policies in 2010 over fears that Lake Ram near the 
village of Mass‘ada could possibly dry up due in part Israel’s misallocation of water resources.309  
Syrian officials took advantage of the situation and entered into indirect talks with Israel over 
exporting 200 million cubic liters of water into the Golan Heights.310  If such talks succeed the 
Golan-Druze will look to Syria again as a sort of protector of Druze livelihood in the Golan 
Heights .  Concurrently the Golan-Druze are blaming Israel for curtailing economic development 
in their villages through the enforcement of their strict building codes and reticence to grant 
building permits to the Golan-Druze.  City officials blame these policies for constricting the 
natural growth which the Israeli authorities commonly use to argue for settlement expansion in 
the West Bank and the Golan Heights.311 
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Resistance, Compliance, and Economics  
 As the Golan-Druze and Syria were cementing their relationship, the Israeli-Druze 
appeared to be undergoing an identity crisis.  The Israeli-Druze community’s seemingly 
perpetual quest for equality had led many to question their role in the state and how they fit 
within the society around them.  The outbreak of the second Intifada and the use of Israeli-Druze 
soldiers in particularly intense campaigns in the West Bank and Gaza prompted Arab leaders to 
speak out against the Druze and call for the community’s leadership to restrain them.312  Many 
prominent figures in the Israeli-Druze community blamed the behavior on the state and the 
manner in which the Druze are treated in the context of Israeli society.  Rabāḥ Ḥalabī, an Israeli-
Druze and professor of education at Haifa University, explained the behavior of Druze soldiers 
as symptomatic of their treatment within the larger society.  “The twofold rejection (by Arabs 
and Israelis) makes them feel suspended between heaven and earth as if they are neither here nor 
there” and they express “considerable frustration and anger both at the Arabs that reject them and 
the Jews that deceive, even betray, them.”313  Ḥalabī also likened the Druze in the IDF to 
Algerian soldiers in the French army who felt the need to “prove their mettle” to their French 
comrades in order to win their trust.314  While the Israeli-Druze continued to identify themselves 
as Druze there was little agreement over how the Druze fit into the greater society around 
them.315 
 During the second Intifada more and more Druze began to vocally oppose service in the 
IDF.  Some Israeli-Druze began advocating a faith oriented lifestyle that rejected politics 
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including military service and advocated a return to more conservative mores and isolation from 
the outside world.316  Still others identifying with Palestinians and Israeli-Arabs felt they should 
not engage in combat against their “Arab brothers.”  The Israeli-Druze who affiliated themselves 
with the Arab and Palestinians faced discrimination in Israel.  In 2004 ‘Alā’ Nafa’a, an Israeli-
Druze from Beit Jan, lost his job for expressing why he refused to serve in the IDF in a televised 
interview broadcast in Israel.317  In the interview Nafa’a explained why he chose to spend time in 
an Israeli prison rather than serve in the military saying, “I belong to a nation that is at war with 
Israel.  I cannot fight my own people, it is my national and legal right not to enlist.”318  
Following the broadcast of the interview his employer chose to dismiss him because of his 
views.  Despite calls for a change to Israeli policy relating to military service coming from the 
Israeli-Druze community over eighty percent of Israeli-Druze men continued to enlist in the IDF.  
This was at least in part due to the Israeli-Druze’s overreliance on the state. 
 The Israeli-Druze’s frustrations with the state erupted again in 2007 in the village of 
Peki’in.  Peki’in’s population consists of a majority of Druze and a growing minority of Jewish 
settlers.  In the years preceding the incident in 2007 settlers had intensified efforts to grow the 
Jewish community in Peki’in.319  In October a large group of Druze youth in Peki’in burned 
down a radio antenna on a Jewish settler’s property and the action was repeated when the 
antenna was replaced.  When the police entered the town after nightfall to arrest the perpetrators 
they were met by a violent resistance from these youth.  The youth were not intimidated by the 
body armor and tear gas of the police units and engaged them in combat.  During the ensuing riot 	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Jewish homes were vandalized and a female police officer was taken hostage by the youth.320  
Somewhat miraculously no one was killed.  Stunned by the violence the older Druze intervened 
in the conflict, first protecting the hostage from the anger of the youth and later helping negotiate 
a deal between the authorities and the community.321  While a handful of Druze youth were 
arrested they were all released within a few days of the incident.  The Peki’in riot revealed not 
only a divide between the pro-Arab and pro-Israel Druze but a generational divide in the 
community.   
 Despite the growing Arab sympathies in the Israeli-Druze community the majority of 
them continue to identify themselves as Israelis.  This evidenced by the success right wing 
political parties such as Likud enjoy in Israeli-Druze villages.322 Doubts persist within the 
community as to how the Druze fit into the future of the state.  Shortly after the Peki’in riots one 
Israeli-Druze expressed his doubts about how the Druze fit into the state and long term plans of 
their Jewish leaders saying, 
We are screwed, we are losing our identity. The Arabs in Israel have a pillow to rest on at 
night because they feel they are Palestinians. We don’t know who we are. I’m jealous of the 
Druze in Lebanon and Syria. They know who they are. In the end, we’ll be like the SLA 
[South Lebanese Army]. They’ll use us and throw us away.323 
 
 Both in the Golan and in Israel, Druze resistance and protest have been common in their 
interactions with the Israeli government.  However this resistance has not resulted in closer ties 
between the Golan and Israeli-Druze communities.  The Israeli-Druze’s cooperation with Israel 
and their support for right wing Israeli parties such as Likud324 have alienated the Golan-Druze.  
There is also a linguistic divide as more and more Israeli-Druze speak Hebrew more regularly 	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than they do Arabic.325  Marriage rates continue to remain low between the communities as the 
Golan-Druze look toward the Syrian-Druze and the more accessible Israeli-Druze community for 
guidance.  It is however possible that continued resistance to the state will push the two 
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Beyond the Nation: The Future of the Druze in the Golan and Israel 
 
Our community resembles the raven that wanted to learn the walk of the partridge.  When it failed, 
it attempted to go back to its own way of walking, but it had forgotten that too.  Now it’s neither a 
raven nor a partridge. – An old Israeli-Druze villager326 
 
 Europe’s destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the colonization of the Levant which led 
to imposition of the European nation-state system on the region violently challenged traditional 
societies and politics.  The new nation-state slowly encroached on traditional notions of 
autonomy and government demanding new allegiance and loyalties.  In the process the Druze 
community was transformed both internally and externally.  Before the twentieth century the 
Druze had been able to carve pockets of autonomy out of the ruling empires and for the most part 
were able to sustain this autonomy through their isolation, unity, and military prowess.  However 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the expansion of the nation-states which succeeded it slowly 
divided the Druze, stripped them of there autonomy, and incorporated them into the new 
governing bodies with competing interests and national identities.  During this process both 
Zionists and Arab nationalists invented history and traditions that incorporated the Druze into the 
imagined nations.  In the middle of the century the Druze actively seemed to embrace these new 
national identities as they interacted with the state.  Nowhere is this more clear than Israel where 
the Druze are privileged above other Arabs but still not treated as equals.  Recently the Israeli-
Druze community has show signs that the younger generation is rejecting the founding narrative 
of the state and trying to strengthen their connections with the Druze in Syria and Lebanon.327  
This leads one to wonder: can the nation be unimagined? 
 In my visit to the Golan Heights I spoke with a Druze teacher who expressed his derision 
for nationalism and nation-states.  In his mind the Druze were progressing past nationalism 	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blaming political leaders for the borders that divided the peoples of the Levant.  He opined that 
“there is co-existence here, I am receiving my education from Damascus and my pay check from 
Israel.  Syrians always tell me they would like to visit Tel-Aviv and try the hummus and my 
friends in Tel-Aviv say the same thing about Damascus.”328  These sentiments are echoed by 
another Golan-Druze who confided, “When there is peace, I don’t care which citizenship I have 
or who the government is.”329  However these Druze still cling to Syrian citizenship and remain 
politically active in relation to their state.  Recently the Golan-Druze have been protesting both 
on behalf of and against besieged President Bahār al-Asad.330  Why have they held so tightly to 
their citizenship and remained politically active despite Israeli pressure to become Israelis?  
 There is no simple answer to this question.  The Golan-Druze have been able to maintain 
at least partial family, economic, political, and cultural associations with the Syrian-Druze 
community for decades despite the occupation and the acrimony that exists between Syria and 
Israel.  While the Golan-Druze could lose the benefits they currently enjoy from the Syrian 
government if they were to accept Israel’s offer of citizen, they would also find new benefits in 
Israel including the right to vote and possibly serve in the military and police forces.  It appears 
that there is no specific reason why the Golan-Druze continue to identify themselves as Syrian, 
but there are many influence ranging from the political to the cultural that may all contribute to 
this identity.  In Israel the answer is no less difficult to answer.  At the founding of the Jewish 
states certain opportunities were afforded the Israeli-Druze that were not afforded to other Arab 
minorities.  These opportunities opened Israeli-Druze society to new influences and with them 	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new means of identifying themselves.  Israeli-Druze have engaged the Jewish state regularly and 
to a large degree have increasingly adopted Israeli lifestyles.331  While the Golan-Druze and 
Israeli-Druze are divided by national identities these divisions are by no means insurmountable. 
 The fissures that have occurred in the Druze community as a result of the rise of nation-
states in the Levant are limited.  The religious leaders of the community still meet on a regular 
basis and unlike secular Druze are allowed to traverse borders from Israel to Syria, Lebanon, and 
vice-versa.  The political leaders in the Druze community have demonstrated degrees of 
continuity between the divisions that separate the Druze.  During Israel’s many invasions of 
Southern Lebanon there were often reports of Israeli-Druze soldiers assisting their Lebanese 
coreligionists and even feigning battles between each other.332  Israeli-Druze politicians have 
also often interceded on behalf of their coreligionists in the Golan.  Ayyūb Kara333, an Israeli-
Druze member of Knesset, has often assisted Syrian brides gain access to the Golan Heights to 
wed their fiancés.  These areas of cooperation however do not translate into shared political 
views.  During 2006 when Israel invaded Southern Lebanon to fight Hizbullah the Israeli and 
Golan-Druze found themselves supporting different sides.334  These relatively new borders have 
also limited social interaction and linguistic commonality.335 
 In both the Golan Heights and Israel proper there are cultural factors from media, politics, 
dress, and languag that influence the national identity of both communities.  These cultural 
factors have created Israeli and Syrian gravitational centers that have pulled the Druze 	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community into different orbits.  The cultural centers in Israel and Syria inform Druze identity in 
terms of language, dress, politics, etc.  This at least in part explains how the social rift between 
the two communities has come to into being.  The strong nationalist forces in both Israel and 
Syria threatened to pull these communities further apart, but this is balance by another force, 
religion.  While the Druze are influenced by cultural forces in relation to where they reside they 
are also influenced by the common experience of being Druze.  While national identities have 
created a schisms in the Druze community it has not obliterated the community altogether.  As 
the gravitational forces of the Druze community increase and counteract those of the national 
community the importance of nation-identity within the Druze community will become less 
important.  
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